Stereotyping by omission: Eliminate the negative, accentuate the positive.

Bergsieker, Hilary B.; Leslie, Lisa M.; Constantine, Vanessa S.; Fiske, Susan T.

doi:10.1037/a0027717

Cited by 153 publications

(167 citation statements)

References 89 publications

(170 reference statements)

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“…If observers are aware of this norm, they may assume that people criticize others in subtle or indirect manners at most (Bergsieker, Leslie, Constantine, & Fiske, 2012;Kervyn, Bergsieker, & Fiske, 2012). They may therefore construe an ambiguous comment as if it conveys negativity, no matter how many plausible alternative interpretations of the comment there might be.…”

Section: Hubris Hypothesis 25mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Self-enhancement Provokes Dislike: The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-superiority Claims

2015

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Most people believe that they are in many respects superior to others. When they publicly express their superiority, they may do so in an explicitly or implicitly comparative manner ("I am better than others" vs. "I am good"). According to the hubris hypothesis, observers dislike explicit self-superiority claims, because these suggest a negative view of others and hence of the observers. The results of two experiments were consistent with the hubris hypothesis.Participants evaluated explicit self-superiority claimants more unfavorably than implicit selfsuperiority claimants (Experiments 1-2). They attributed less warmth, but not less competence, to explicit than implicit self-superiority claimants (Experiment 2), and this occurred to the extent that participants inferred a negative view of others (Experiments 1-2) and hence of them (Experiment 2).Keywords: self-enhancement, superiority, self-presentation, social comparison, hubris hypothesis HUBRIS HYPOTHESIS 3 Why Self-Enhancement Provokes Dislike:The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-Superiority Claims People believe that, in many respects, they are better and behave better than others (Alicke & Govorun, 2005;Sedikides & Alicke, 2012). These self-superiority beliefs have been linked with diverse interpersonal consequences, ranging from social acceptance to social rejection (Hoorens, 2011;Sedikides, Hoorens, & Dufner, 2015). We argue that the interpersonal consequences of self-superiority beliefs hinge, in part, on the manner in which they are expressed.People may convey self-superiority beliefs by claiming that they are "better than others." Alternatively, they may do so by claiming that they are "good." Borrowing terms introduced by Alicke (2007), we call these "explicit self-superiority claims" and "implicit self-superiority claims," respectively (cf. Hoorens & Van Damme, 2012). Although it is tempting to refer to the latter as non-comparative rather than implicitly comparative (cf. Hoorens, Pandelaere, Oldersma, & Sedikides, 2012), we have come to prefer the explicit-implicit distinction because even seemingly non-comparative self-judgements involve social comparison (Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2010). Performance success is typically defined as doing better than others (Gaines, Duvall, Webster, & Smith, 2005). Also, socially comparative information often influences selfjudgments more than any other type of information (Goolsby & Chaplin, 1988;Klein, 2003;Wood & Wilson, 2003; but see Moore & Klein, 2008). Socially comparative information even influences self-judgments, affect, and behavioral intentions in those cases where objective standards are available and relevant (Klein, 1997).There are good reasons to assert, therefore, that both explicit and implicit self-superiority claims rest upon the belief of being superior to others. Still, observers dislike explicit, but not implicit, self-superiority claims and claimants . But why do they do so?The answer cannot be that explicit, relative to implicit, self-superiority claims communic...

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Section: Hubris Hypothesis 25mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Self-enhancement Provokes Dislike: The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-superiority Claims

2015

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“…This space usefully describes a variety of human social perceptions: over US samples, both convenience [students, adults (23)] and representative [adults (24)]; over dozens of countries, using their own social groups (26,27); over time [Italian Fascists (28); American students since 1933 (29)]; over levels of analysis, from individuals (30) to subtypes of women and men (31), immigrants (32), gay men (25), and African Americans (33); and even over other intent-having entities, such as animal species* and corporations (34,35). These warmth-by-competence data suggest the bold conclusion that the dimensions are universally descriptive of group images.…”

Section: Identifying Whom To Trustmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gaining trust as well as respect in communicating to motivated audiences about science topics

Fiske

Dupree

2014

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

Self Cite

366

291

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Expertise is a prerequisite for communicator credibility, entailing the knowledge and ability to be accurate. Trust also is essential to communicator credibility. Audiences view trustworthiness as the motivation to be truthful. Identifying whom to trust follows systematic principles. People decide quickly another’s apparent intent: Who is friend or foe, on their side or not, or a cooperator or competitor. Those seemingly on their side are deemed warm (friendly, trustworthy). People then decide whether the other is competent to enact those intents. Perception of scientists, like other social perceptions, involves inferring both their apparent intent (warmth) and capability (competence). To illustrate, we polled adults online about typical American jobs, rated as American society views them, on warmth and competence dimensions, as well as relevant emotions. Ambivalently perceived high-competence but low-warmth, “envied” professions included lawyers, chief executive officers, engineers, accountants, scientists, and researchers. Being seen as competent but cold might not seem problematic until one recalls that communicator credibility requires not just status and expertise but also trustworthiness (warmth). Other research indicates the risk from being enviable. Turning to a case study of scientific communication, another online sample of adults described public attitudes toward climate scientists specifically. Although distrust is low, the apparent motive to gain research money is distrusted. The literature on climate science communicators agrees that the public trusts impartiality, not persuasive agendas. Overall, communicator credibility needs to address both expertise and trustworthiness. Scientists have earned audiences’ respect, but not necessarily their trust. Discussing, teaching, and sharing information can earn trust to show scientists’ trustworthy intentions.

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“…Consistent with the functional approach to the understanding of attitude structure (e.g., FSM; Maio & Olson, 2000) and intergroup ambivalence (e.g., Bergsieker et al, 2012;Fiske et al, 2002;Jost & Kay, 2005;Maio et al, 2001), we investigated the justificatory potential of out-group ambivalence for contributing to the motivated need of expressing prejudice rather than suppressing it predicted by the JSM (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Across two experimental studies, using different types of target groups to maximise generalisation of findings, the present work provided convergent support for the proposed framework.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Ambivalence, prejudice and negative behavioural tendencies towards out-groups: The moderating role of attitude basis

Costarelli

Gerłowska

2014

Cognition and Emotion

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Two experiments explored the relations between prejudice (suppression), (cognitive) ambivalence and negative behavioural tendencies towards out-groups. The current work argues that expressing out-group ambivalence based on cognitive, but not affective, information is a strategy to justify one's otherwise suppressed prejudice, which may ultimately "cover" the discriminatory nature of out-group-directed negative behavioural tendencies. Two experiments show that (1) participants evaluating the out-group in a normative context inducing prejudice suppression are more likely to self-report ambivalent beliefs rather than ambivalent emotions concerning the out-group as compared with participants whose prejudice expression is induced and (2) high-prejudice participants compared with low-prejudice participants are more prone to out-group-directed negative behavioural tendencies when these latter are self-reported after the expression of ambivalent beliefs but not ambivalent emotions concerning the out-group, and when the expression of their prejudicial evaluations is salient but not when it is not. In light of the extent to which ambivalent attitudes towards out-groups are often seamlessly integrated into public discourse, the implications of the findings are discussed not only for intergroup research but also at the societal level.

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Stereotyping by omission: Eliminate the negative, accentuate the positive.

Cited by 153 publications

References 89 publications

Why Self-enhancement Provokes Dislike: The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-superiority Claims

Why Self-enhancement Provokes Dislike: The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-superiority Claims

Gaining trust as well as respect in communicating to motivated audiences about science topics

Ambivalence, prejudice and negative behavioural tendencies towards out-groups: The moderating role of attitude basis

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