Within a dual-level model of personality, loneliness, and attitudes toward aloneness can be regarded as phase-specific adaptations that are influenced by personality traits. Therefore, we examined the associations between personality traits (i.e., the Big Five, sociotropy, and autonomy), loneliness, and attitudes toward aloneness in two samples of late adolescents (N = 1388 and N = 419). A specific pattern of associations was found that replicated across samples. Lower scores on agreeableness and stronger concerns about independence (i.e., greater autonomy) were positive predictors of both peer-related and parent-related loneliness. Extraversion was a predictor of lower affinity for and greater aversion to aloneness. The other personality traits were predictors of a particular type of loneliness or a specific attitude toward aloneness.

Most people believe that they are in many respects superior to others. When they publicly express their superiority, they may do so in an explicitly or implicitly comparative manner ("I am better than others" vs. "I am good"). According to the hubris hypothesis, observers dislike explicit self-superiority claims, because these suggest a negative view of others and hence of the observers. The results of two experiments were consistent with the hubris hypothesis.Participants evaluated explicit self-superiority claimants more unfavorably than implicit selfsuperiority claimants (Experiments 1-2). They attributed less warmth, but not less competence, to explicit than implicit self-superiority claimants (Experiment 2), and this occurred to the extent that participants inferred a negative view of others (Experiments 1-2) and hence of them (Experiment 2).Keywords: self-enhancement, superiority, self-presentation, social comparison, hubris hypothesis HUBRIS HYPOTHESIS 3 Why Self-Enhancement Provokes Dislike:The Hubris Hypothesis and the Aversiveness of Explicit Self-Superiority Claims People believe that, in many respects, they are better and behave better than others (Alicke & Govorun, 2005;Sedikides & Alicke, 2012). These self-superiority beliefs have been linked with diverse interpersonal consequences, ranging from social acceptance to social rejection (Hoorens, 2011;Sedikides, Hoorens, & Dufner, 2015). We argue that the interpersonal consequences of self-superiority beliefs hinge, in part, on the manner in which they are expressed.People may convey self-superiority beliefs by claiming that they are "better than others." Alternatively, they may do so by claiming that they are "good." Borrowing terms introduced by Alicke (2007), we call these "explicit self-superiority claims" and "implicit self-superiority claims," respectively (cf. Hoorens & Van Damme, 2012). Although it is tempting to refer to the latter as non-comparative rather than implicitly comparative (cf. Hoorens, Pandelaere, Oldersma, & Sedikides, 2012), we have come to prefer the explicit-implicit distinction because even seemingly non-comparative self-judgements involve social comparison (Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2010). Performance success is typically defined as doing better than others (Gaines, Duvall, Webster, & Smith, 2005). Also, socially comparative information often influences selfjudgments more than any other type of information (Goolsby & Chaplin, 1988;Klein, 2003;Wood & Wilson, 2003; but see Moore & Klein, 2008). Socially comparative information even influences self-judgments, affect, and behavioral intentions in those cases where objective standards are available and relevant (Klein, 1997).There are good reasons to assert, therefore, that both explicit and implicit self-superiority claims rest upon the belief of being superior to others. Still, observers dislike explicit, but not implicit, self-superiority claims and claimants . But why do they do so?The answer cannot be that explicit, relative to implicit, self-superiority claims communic...

Identity formation is a core developmental task in adolescence and functions as a key resource for transitioning to adulthood. This study investigated how adolescents with congenital cardiac disease form their identity and how it relates to demographic and medical parameters, quality of life, perceived health, depressive symptoms, and loneliness. A total of 429 adolescents aged 14-18 years with congenital cardiac disease and 403 matched controls completed questionnaires on identity and all outcome variables. There were five meaningful identity statuses, similar to those obtained in the control sample, which were found in the patient sample. Of them, two statuses--achievement and foreclosure--were characterised by a strong sense of identity; one status--diffused diffusion--especially was characterised by a weak sense of identity combined with high scores on worry about the future. These identity statuses were differentially related to outcome variables, with individuals in diffused diffusion especially scoring highest on depressive symptoms, problems in school, treatment anxiety, and communication problems with clinicians, and lowest on quality of life. Having a strong sense of personal identity was found to protect against such maladaptive outcomes. In sum, most adolescents with congenital cardiac disease moved through their identity formation process in a similar manner to other adolescents. Adolescents with a diffused identity were particularly at risk of experiencing maladjustment and problems in treatment adherence. Hence, developing intervention strategies to provide continuity of care on the road to adulthood involves paying attention to core developmental tasks, such as identity formation in adolescents with congenital cardiac disease.

According to the hubris hypothesis, observers respond more unfavorably to individuals who express their positive self-views comparatively than to those who express their positive self-views non-comparatively, because observers infer that the former hold a more disparaging view of others and particularly of observers. Two experiments extended the hubris hypothesis in the domain of optimism. Observers attributed less warmth (but not less competence) to, and showed less interest in affiliating with, an individual displaying comparative optimism (the belief that one's future will be better than others' future) than with an individual displaying absolute optimism (the belief that one's future will be good). Observers responded differently to individuals displaying comparative versus absolute optimism, because they inferred that the former held a gloomier view of the observers' future. Consistent with previous research, observers still attributed more positive traits to a comparative or absolute optimist than to a comparative or absolute pessimist.

We tested the prediction, derived from the hubris hypothesis, that bragging might serve as a verbal provocation and thus enhance aggression. Experiments 1 and 2 were vignette studies where participants could express hypothetical aggression; Experiment 3 was an actual decision task where participants could make aggressive and/or prosocial choices. Observers disliked an explicit braggart (who claimed to be "better than others") or a competence braggart as compared with an implicit braggart (who claimed to be "good") or a warmth braggart, respectively. Showing that explicit and competence bragging function as verbal provocations, observers responded more aggressively to the explicit and competence braggart than to the implicit and warmth braggart, respectively. They did so because they inferred that an explicit and a competence braggart viewed other people and them negatively, and therefore disliked the braggart. Rather than praising the self, braggarts are sometimes viewed as insulting others.