STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION^*

Abstract

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.

The Implications of Utilizing Market Information and Adopting Agricultural Advice for Farmers in Developing Economies

“…They show that even if information sharing can increase the profit of each firm, firms will conceal information in equilibrium. Jansen (2010) studies the information sharing in R&D competition. He shows that the incentive to disclose information depends on whether the winner firm of an R&D race is capable of appropriating the full revenue of its innovation.…”

From market failures to market opportunities: managing innovation under asymmetric information

“…radical) innovations from imitation and harness the full benefit of their commercialisation. In the same vein, Jansen (2010) argued that incentives to strategically disclose information depend on the trade-off between two effects: business stealing and free riding that come from information asymmetries. The business stealing effect emerges when firms, while competing for an innovation where winner takes all, over-invest in R&D. The free rider effect appears when the winner firm of an R&D race is not capable of appropriating the full revenue of its innovation, because the later generates positive externalities (see Jansen 2010, p. 350).…”

Innováció-finanszírozás asszimetrikus információs helyzetben

“…[2010]). DOI: 10.14267/phd.2016006 Az információk megosztásának az innovátor üzletére negatív következményei is lehetnek, az üzlet lehetséges ellopásának veszélye és a továbbgyűrűző hatásoknak köszönhető potyautas magatartás miatt (Jansen [2010] A kontraszelekció következményei ellen a jól informált félnek, jelen esetben a vállalkozónak lehetősége van jelzéssel (signalling) felfednie a projektjének típusát.…”