Strategic Information Revelation in an R&amp;D Race with Spillovers

Jansen, Jos

doi:10.2139/ssrn.517982

Cited by 10 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The introduction of some noise would alter the information and beliefs of firms, since the firms now base their investment decisions on a signal (and the message about the signal), which is positively correlated with θ . But the basic intuition and qualitative results do not change (Jansen [2004]).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION^*

Jansen¹

2010

The J Industrial Economics

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The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION^*

Jansen¹

2010

The J Industrial Economics

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“…The introduction of some noise would alter the information and beliefs of firms, since the firms now base their investment decisions on a signal (and the message about the signal), which is positively correlated with y. But the basic intuition and qualitative results do not change (Jansen [2004]).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite the altered beliefs and failure of full unraveling, the basic trade-offs in the analysis are unchanged. Finally, the model can be extended by introducing two-sided asymmetric information without changing the qualitative results (Jansen [2004]).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A full welfare analysis would have to include the effects of 20 For example, each firm maximizes industry profits in a model where the identity of the informed firm (S) is determined randomly at the beginning of the game, and the firms choose the spillover before their roles (i.e., receiver or sender) are determined. Alternatively, industry profits are relevant in a symmetric model with two-sided asymmetric information (Jansen [2004]). 21 Clearly, if firms precommit to a disclosure rule non-cooperatively, then full information concealment is the dominant strategy, as follows from Proposition 2. rent dissipation.…”

Section: Vi(ii) Policy Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation

Jansen

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…In a patent race with product market spillovers, Jansen (2005) analyzes the incentives to disclose investment costs to impact on a rival's incentive to invest. The investment costs are perfectly correlated across the firms, so there is no knowledge spillover like that in our model.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

Gill

2008

Economics Manag Strategy

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We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results during the course of a patent contest. Despite knowledge spillovers, the leading innovator sometimes discloses to signal commitment to the project, and so potentially inducing a rival's exit. Surprisingly, when development costs are low the leading innovator does not need to disclose to induce the same strategic deterrence effect as that which arises from disclosure. Taking into account wasteful duplication of R&D effort, a patent office can increase welfare by choosing the probability of granting a contested patent and so altering the proportion of rivals that the leading innovator deters.

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Strategic Information Revelation in an R&D Race with Spillovers

Cited by 10 publications

References 19 publications

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION^*

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION^*

Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation

Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

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Strategic Information Revelation in an R&D Race with Spillovers

Cited by 10 publications

References 19 publications

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION*

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION*

Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation

Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION^*

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION^*