Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups

Fletcher, Jeffrey; Zwick, Martin

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.01.004

Cited by 70 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…If all players contribute, their payoff is (r-1)c, which is independent of group size m. In our experiment, c=1 monetary unit (MU), r=3 and m≥2 is variable. This game was first described in Wilson (1975), see also Sugden (1986), Yamagishi (1986, Fletcher and Zwick (2004), Sigmund (2010). It is very similar to the usual public good game (PG game), see e.g.…”

Section: Theoretical Background: a Choice Of Gamesmentioning

confidence: 97%

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

Zhang

Silva

et al. 2013

Exp Econ

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Section: Theoretical Background: a Choice Of Gamesmentioning

confidence: 97%

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

Zhang

Silva

et al. 2013

Exp Econ

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“…Over many years, D. S. Wilson was the main proponent of the idea of group selection (20-22). Nowadays, there seems to be a renewed interest in the subject, as demonstrated by many empirical and theoretical studies (23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28). The current analysis of group selection is also closely related to the attempt at understanding the simultaneous effect of natural selection on multiple-levels (29)(30)(31).…”

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confidence: 99%

Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection

Traulsen

Nowak

2006

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

827

552

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We propose a minimalist stochastic model of multilevel (or group) selection. A population is subdivided into groups. Individuals interact with other members of the group in an evolutionary game that determines their fitness. Individuals reproduce, and offspring are added to the same group. If a group reaches a certain size, it can split into two. Faster reproducing individuals lead to larger groups that split more often. In our model, higher-level selection emerges as a byproduct of individual reproduction and population structure. We derive a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation by group selection: if b͞c > 1 ؉ n͞m, then group selection favors cooperation. The parameters b and c denote the benefit and cost of the altruistic act, whereas n and m denote the maximum group size and the number of groups. The model can be extended to more than two levels of selection and to include migration.finite populations ͉ prisoner's dilemma ͉ group selection ͉ fixation probability ͉ stochastic process C ompetition between groups can lead to selection of cooperative behavior. This idea can be traced back to Charles Darwin, who wrote in 1871: ''There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who..were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over other tribes; and this would be natural selection'' (1). The first mathematical model of group selection was proposed in 1945 by Sewall Wright (2). The enthusiastic attempt of early group selectionists to understand all of the evolution of altruism from this one perspective (3, 4) has led to vigorous criticism and a general denial of such ideas for decades (5-8). Only a small number of biologists continued to work in this area (9-19). Over many years, D. S. Wilson was the main proponent of the idea of group selection (20-22). Nowadays, there seems to be a renewed interest in the subject, as demonstrated by many empirical and theoretical studies (23-28). The current analysis of group selection is also closely related to the attempt at understanding the simultaneous effect of natural selection on multiple-levels (29-31). In our opinion, group selection is an important organizing principle that permeates evolutionary processes from the emergence of the first cells to eusociality and the economics of nations.Consider a population that is subdivided into groups. The fitness of individuals is determined by the payoff from an evolutionary game. Interactions occur between members of the same group. We model stochastic evolutionary dynamics. In any one time step, a single individual from the entire population is chosen for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness. The offspring is added to the same group. If the group reaches a critical size, n, it will divide into two groups with probability q. The members of the group are randomly distributed over the two daughter groups, see Fig. 1. With probability 1Ϫ q, the group does not divide, but a random individual of the group is eliminate...

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“…In particular, while most models leading to cooperation assume weak altruism, Fletcher and Zwick (2004) have shown that strong altruism can prevail in public goods games of 'others-only' type if groups are randomly reassembled, not every generation, but every few generations. Our scenario emphasizes a different, but related point.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism

et al. 2009

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Cooperation in joint enterprises poses a social dilemma. How can altruistic behavior be sustained if selfish alternatives provide a higher payoff? This social dilemma can be overcome by the threat of sanctions. But a sanctioning system is itself a public good and poses a second-order social dilemma. In this paper, we show by means of deterministic and stochastic evolutionary game theory that imitation-driven evolution can lead to the emergence of cooperation based on punishment, provided the participation in the joint enterprise is not compulsory. This surprising result-cooperation can be enforced if participation is voluntary-holds even in the case of 'strong altruism', when the benefits of a player's contribution are reaped by the other participants only.

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Strong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups

Cited by 70 publications

References 36 publications

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract

Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection

Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism

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