Study on the Evolutionary Game of Information Security Supervision in Smart Cities under Different Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

Abstract

At present, the information security problems of smart city show a high incidence, and it is necessary to strengthen the information security supervision of smart city. In the process of supervision, there is a game relationship between local government and smart city enterprises. This paper firstly constructs the game matrices of local government and enterprises under the static and three dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms, then conducts numerical simulation with the help of MATLAB to arrive at the optimal reward and punishment mechanism through comparison, and finally explores the influence of the change of the upper limit value of each key variable on the directionality and sensitivity of the decision-making behavior of game subjects under the optimal mechanism. The result shows that initial value is one of the decisive factors influencing the choice of management strategy by enterprise. Dynamic reward and dynamic punishment mechanism is the best reward and punishment mechanism for information security supervision in smart cities. In case the upper limit value of key parameters is increased, a larger punishment has a strong influence on the positive strategy choice of the enterprise, and a reasonable adjustment of the reward policy can likewise mobilize the probability that the enterprise actively chooses to strengthen information security management. Based on the simulation results, we propose a feasible strategy.

Information Security Applications in Smart Cities: A Bibliometric Analysis of Emerging Research

“…These platforms are a means for aggregating concepts of the other five clusters, as can be understood by the diagram in Figure 6 in the answer for RQ2, synthesizing the relationships between all clusters of applications. (e) Evaluation of threats to cybersecurity: this cluster deals with ways to evaluate threats to the smart cities systems, facilitating, for example, the design and management of security platforms and ensuring the necessary indicators and related analysis to promote the detection and prevention of cyberattacks [311,319]. It covers from devices to threat evaluation techniques, which can be used in support of security measures planning [6,54].…”

Research on the effectiveness of online food safety supervision under the existence of settled enterprises’ myopic cognitive bias

“…One type of research mainly started from different market subjects of food safety governance environment to discuss the behavioral strategies of food safety governance with the participation of different governance stakeholders [ [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] ]. The other type of research mainly focused on the discussion of the optimal punishment of government regulators [ [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] ]. The model construction method of game theory was mostly used in these two types of studies, and most of these studies were based on the perspective of the regulators.…”

How Does the Smart City Policy Influence Digital Infrastructure? Spatial Evidence from China

“…Government investment in smart city projects often involves funding for research and development, digital infrastructure upgrades, and the implementation of pilot programs to test and refine new technologies and approaches. By prioritising smart city initiatives, governments can signal their commitment to sustainable urban development, attracting additional investments from private and international sources and fostering public-private partnerships (PPPs) to leverage expertise and resources across various sectors [29,30].…”