Supply chain finance: A three‐party decision model with suppliers' guarantees for retailers

Yan, Bo; Luo, Kun; Liu, Lifeng; Chen, Yanru; Yang, Yifan

doi:10.1002/mde.3164

Cited by 13 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Yan et al studied the optimal guarantee mechanism of banks, retailers, and suppliers in supply chain finance with the Stackelberg game method [14]. Yan et al analyzed the effect of risk aversion on the cooperative strategies of banks, manufacturers, and retailers in supply chain finance [15].…”

Section: Relationship Of Participants In Supply Chain Financementioning

confidence: 99%

Network Evolutionary Game‐Based Diffusion Mechanism regarding the Nonperformance of Farmers in Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

Sun

2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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Agricultural supply chain finance effectively alleviates the problem of farmers’ credit constraints and realizes the commercialization and sustainability of agriculture. However, the rapid spread of farmers’ credit default behavior will seriously affect the stability of the agricultural supply chain and the wide application of agricultural supply chain finance. To prevent the rapid spread of farmers’ credit default behavior, the diffusion mechanism of farmers’ default behavior is studied with network evolutionary game. The results indicate the following: (a) When some farmers choose the default strategy because their default income is greater than their performance income, the default behavior in the small-world network will not spread to the whole network. However, in the scale-free network, when the default rate of return exceeds a certain threshold, it will lead to the spread of default behavior throughout the network. (b) In the small-world network, the spread of default will be inhibited to some extent with the increase of extra returns. However, the effect of raising extra returns on the spread of default behavior is not obvious in the scale-free network.

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Section: Relationship Of Participants In Supply Chain Financementioning

confidence: 99%

Network Evolutionary Game‐Based Diffusion Mechanism regarding the Nonperformance of Farmers in Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

Sun

2022

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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“…However, the former research results are mostly based on the methods of financial ratio analysis, regression model analysis, and propensity score matching evaluation (Oh et al, 2009 ), which tend to ignore the dynamic changes of guarantee market and the interaction of business behaviors between guarantee subjects. Therefore, some scholars explored the operation behavior of financing guarantee institutions (He et al, 2014 ), financing equilibrium under the effect of credit guarantee (Yan et al, 2016 ; Wang et al, 2022 ), and factors influencing equilibrium efficiency (Yan et al, 2017 , 2020 ) within the completely rational traditional game framework.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Breakthrough Path of Low-Level Equilibrium of China's Policy-Oriented Financing Guarantee Market

Ding

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Policy-oriented financing guarantee schemes are widely adopted in the world to alleviate the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. However, the development level of policy-oriented financing guarantee market in China has not reached the desired high-level equilibrium target, even though governments have issued a series of guiding policies. Accordingly, based on the evolutionary game theory, this study establishes and analyzes the game model between local governments, guarantee institutions, and banks. Then, the breakthrough effects of different paths on the low-level equilibrium of the guarantee market are simulated. The results show that strengthening superior government's performance appraisal intensity can only partially delay the “window period” of the low-level equilibrium, while adjusting local governments' compensation coefficients or increasing banks' risk sharing ratio have further synergistic effects on the realization of the high-level equilibrium. Additionally, dynamic reward and penalty mechanism of the local governments can effectively restrain the unbalanced state of financing guarantee market caused by banks' excess compensation risk, and finally impel the stabilization of the high-level equilibrium state.

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“…The studies found that the after‐sales service program aimed at maximizing profits does not match the level of customer satisfaction. Yan et al (2020) analyzed the situation that suppliers provide retailers with guaranteed financing services; the results shown that when the proportion of supplier guarantees increases, the bank's margin rate and the supplier's profit will also increase. Hong et al (2019) analyzed the performance of CLSCs in different service structures.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A closed‐loop supply chain decision model considering corporate social responsibility and value‐added services

et al. 2021

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This paper by comparing the decision results in three closed‐loop supply chain (CLSC) cases, to explore the effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and value‐added service on the mechanism of stakeholders' decision making. The results show that CSR and value‐added services play significant roles in the optimal decisions of different individuals. The improvement of the value‐added service level is conducive to increasing the demand and the recovery rate, thereby promoting the profitability of the supply chain and social welfare. However, the effect of value‐added services on the performance of stakeholders strictly depends on the degree of CSR. Our numerical results provide insights into social welfare improvement.

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Supply chain finance: A three‐party decision model with suppliers' guarantees for retailers

Cited by 13 publications

References 16 publications

Network Evolutionary Game‐Based Diffusion Mechanism regarding the Nonperformance of Farmers in Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

Network Evolutionary Game‐Based Diffusion Mechanism regarding the Nonperformance of Farmers in Agricultural Supply Chain Finance

Breakthrough Path of Low-Level Equilibrium of China's Policy-Oriented Financing Guarantee Market

A closed‐loop supply chain decision model considering corporate social responsibility and value‐added services

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