Support for asymmetric violence among Arab populations: The clash of cultures, social identity, or counterdominance?

Abstract

Using a random sample of 383 Muslims and Christians in Lebanon and Syria, we explored the degree of public support for two distinct kinds of asymmetric violence—“fundamentalist violence” and “resistance violence”—against the United States as a function of three explanatory narratives: a clash of cultures narrative, social identity/self-categorization theory, and a counterdominance perspective. Multiple regression analyses showed that the factors most closely associated with support of asymmetric violence among Arab populations was very much dependent upon the type of asymmetric violence. Among both Christians and Muslims, the results showed that perceived incompatibility between Arab and American cultures was the best predictor of support for fundamentalist violence, while perceived American domination of the Arab world was the distinctly strongest predictor of support for resistance violence. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

Muslims’ emotions toward Americans predict support for Hezbollah and Al Qaeda for threat-specific reasons

“…Other empirical work has focused on the role of ingroup identifications in promoting negative intergroup attitudes and actions. For example, Arab identification is a strong predictor of support for Islamist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah (Levin et al 2003) and predicts support for both resistance and fundamentalist violence (Sidanius et al 2015). Here we look beyond the previously demonstrated effects of relevant ingroup memberships and identifications on support for Islamist organizations and focus on the appeal of the unique goals of the organizations themselves.…”

“…Through these various actions, Hezbollah addresses material resource issues, and in its rhetoric against American and Israeli dominance of Arabs, it invokes the symbolic issue of restoring Arab pride and respect. Thus, although Hezbollah is an Islamist organization that shares elements of Al Qaeda's Islamist goals, Hezbollah primarily has a resistance agenda in its relationship with the United States (see also Sidanius et al 2015). Resistance to domination involves the protection of both material (economic, physical) and symbolic resources (group pride).…”

“…Thus, although Al Qaeda's agenda shares elements of Hezbollah's resistance goals, it primarily concerns moralcultural or value issues. Regarding Muslim-U.S. relationships, Al Qaeda primarily has a rejection agenda; its supporters reject who Americans are and the contaminating cultural influence they have on Islam (see also Sidanius et al 2015). As such, their rejection goals include containing the contaminating influence of the West (e.g., by defending Islam from Western cultural influence) and in the extreme eliminating it (e.g., by hurting Americans).…”

“…As Muslim-dominated Arab nations on average are substantially less wealthy than the U.S. (Fund for Peace 2011), and there is a recent history of Christian nations becoming predominant over Muslims or occupying Muslim lands, many Muslim Arabs feel they are being exploited and controlled by American desires for domination, which they find demeaning and humiliating (e.g., Fattah and Fierke 2009;Kohut 2005;Little 2002; see also Berger 2014). Given the thrust of Hezbollah's resistance agenda (e.g., resistance to American domination), we expect perceptions that Americans threaten to dominate Arabs' material (e.g., economic) and symbolic resources (e.g., group esteem) to be more strongly associated with support for Hezbollah than Al Qaeda among our participants (see also Sidanius et al 2015).…”

“…Thus, in the eyes of some Muslims, Americans' materialism, open sexuality, freedom of expression, and individualism may pose a value contamination threat. Given Al Qaeda's rejection ideology (e.g., rejection of Americans' inferior values and way of life), we expect perceptions that Americans threaten to contaminate cherished ingroup values to be more strongly associated with support for Al Qaeda than Hezbollah among our participants (see also Sidanius et al 2015).…”