Synthetic genomics: Options for governance

Garfinkel, Michele S.; Endy, Drew; Epstein, Gerald L.; Friedman, Robert M.

doi:10.1089/ind.2007.3.333

Cited by 69 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 19 publications

(7 reference statements)

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“…In addition, for labs working with lethal pathogens, new laws, such as the 2001 Patriot Act and 2002 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, have been enacted to increase safeguards for lethal pathogens; other recent proposals have explored regulation of certain types of equipment such as DNA synthesizing machines (Garfinkel et al, 2007;Bhattacharjee, 2006). In terms of publications, 32 leading scientific journal editors met in 2003 and agreed on the importance of new biosecurity review processes for evaluating scientific publications that could compromise national security (Editorial, 2003a,b).…”

Section: The Dominant Biosecurity Framesupporting

confidence: 81%

“…For example, in assessing the threat from a particular synthetic genome, one would need to put more emphasis on examining the sociotechnical assemblages that are required to synthesize a pathogen at the laboratory bench, and then examine what additional assemblages are required to produce, weaponize, and deliver the pathogen for a mass casualty attack. To date, important synthetic genomics reports issued by the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB) and J Craig Venter/MIT/CSIS only briefly refer to some of the art of synthetic genomics, while failing to discuss in detail what skills are involved, how they are developed and situated in particular laboratory practices, or what socio-organizational elements would be required for successful development and transfer of this technology for terrorist or state application (NSABB, 2006;Garfinkel et al, 2007). In looking at state-level bioweapons programs, it is clear that creating a mass-casualty biological weapon involved interdisciplinary teams of scientific and engineering specialists who had developed special types of weapons know-how across the weapons production chain that were integrated to produce a workable weapon (Vogel, 2006).…”

Section: Moving Beyond a Biotech Revolution: An Alternative Biosecurimentioning

confidence: 99%

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Framing biosecurity: an alternative to the biotech revolution model?

Vogel

2008

Sci. and Pub. Pol.

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Since 11 September 2001 there is growing national and international policy focus on the increasing threat of bioterrorism. Underpinning this policy focus is a dominant frame of discourse for how to consider biosecurity threats. This paper describes some of the key ideas comprising the dominant biosecurity discourse and contrasts it with an alternative framing of the issues. To illustrate these different frames, it draws on examples from the emerging field of synthetic genomes and other biotechnologies that have generated security concerns. It argues that the current dominant frame takes away attention from other important considerations for assessing the threat from biotechnologies.

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Section: The Dominant Biosecurity Framesupporting

confidence: 81%

Section: Moving Beyond a Biotech Revolution: An Alternative Biosecurimentioning

confidence: 99%

Framing biosecurity: an alternative to the biotech revolution model?

Vogel

2008

Sci. and Pub. Pol.

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“…In the near future, however, the risk of nefarious use will rise because of the increasing speed and capability of the technology and its widening accessibility. […] Ten years from now, it may be easier to synthesize almost any pathogenic virus than to obtain it through other means [(15), p. 12–13]. And a group of synthetic biologists (including Drew Endy and George Church) published, together with leading DNA synthesis companies and four FBI staff, a commentary in Nature Biotechnology on “DNA synthesis and biological security,” which stated that: Like any powerful technology, DNA synthesis has the potential to be purposefully misapplied. Misuse of DNA-synthesis technology could give rise to both known and unforeseeable threats to our biological safety and security [(43), p. 627].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the â€œMythsâ€

Jefferson

Лентзос

Marris

2014

Front. Public Health

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Synthetic biology, a field that aims to “make biology easier to engineer,” is routinely described as leading to an increase in the “dual-use” threat, i.e., the potential for the same scientific research to be “used” for peaceful purposes or “misused” for warfare or terrorism. Fears have been expressed that the “de-skilling” of biology, combined with online access to the genomic DNA sequences of pathogenic organisms and the reduction in price for DNA synthesis, will make biology increasingly accessible to people operating outside well-equipped professional research laboratories, including people with malevolent intentions. The emergence of do-it-yourself (DIY) biology communities and of the student iGEM competition has come to epitomize this supposed trend toward greater ease of access and the associated potential threat from rogue actors. In this article, we identify five “myths” that permeate discussions about synthetic biology and biosecurity, and argue that they embody misleading assumptions about both synthetic biology and bioterrorism. We demonstrate how these myths are challenged by more realistic understandings of the scientific research currently being conducted in both professional and DIY laboratories, and by an analysis of historical cases of bioterrorism. We show that the importance of tacit knowledge is commonly overlooked in the dominant narrative: the focus is on access to biological materials and digital information, rather than on human practices and institutional dimensions. As a result, public discourse on synthetic biology and biosecurity tends to portray speculative scenarios about the future as realities in the present or the near future, when this is not warranted. We suggest that these “myths” play an important role in defining synthetic biology as a “promissory” field of research and as an “emerging technology” in need of governance.

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“…Both genetic engineering and synthetic biology involve the modification of living organisms, which, by definition, are self‐propagating. But synthetic biology adds a new dimension because the development of the internet and the routinization of many biotechnological procedures have made the field more easily accessible (Garfinkel et al , 2007). For example, each year, MIT organizes an undergraduate competition in which students ‘programme’ bacteria to perform certain functions (http://www.igem.org).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%