Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical Framework

Abstract

Like other forms of criminal deviance, terrorism requires basic knowledge, knowledge about whom or what to attack-and how to attack them. Terrorists with sufficient knowledge and practical experience are more likely to execute "successful" attacks than those lacking these critical attributes. But some terrorists are more informed-and experienced-than others. The skills and expertise of those who plan, coordinate, and execute terrorist attacks are variable, not constant. These assumptions beg an important, yet understudied, question: how do terrorists actually acquire the information and expertise they need to carry out acts of political violence? The answer, this study shows, depends on the type of knowledge being acquired. Abstract technical knowledge, or techne, lends itself to codification in knowledge-based artifacts and can be readily taught through formal instruction. While techne is important to terrorists, it is not their only, or even their most important, source of knowledge. Terrorists also rely on experiential knowledge and cunning intelligence, in a word mētis, to develop the practical expertise that allows them to perform violent acts in local settings. Mētis helps account for the resilience of "Islamist terrorism" since the war on terror began seven years ago. This study makes three contributions to the small, but growing, body of literature on terrorism and learning. First, the research focuses on two case studies, "Islamist" militancy in Spain and the United Kingdom, and Western Europe more generally, that have been largely ignored in existing studies on terrorism learning. Second, contrary to current research and media accounts, this study critically examines the role of the Internet in facilitating terrorism learning. While the Internet likely plays an important role in 10 This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Militants who dedicate themselves to political violence are a motley-lot, full of unyielding devotion to the cause, but possessing varying levels of understanding about their craft. While dedication is important, intentions do not equal capabilities. Indeed, what is striking about several recent terrorist attacks in Western Europe, such as the failed car bombings in the West End neighborhood of London and the Glasgow International Airport in the summer of 2007, is the apparent incompetence of the perpetrators. The London and Glasgow attacks, carried out by presumably intelligent and well-educated medical doctors, involved the amateurish use of sedans and S.U.V.s stuffed with gas canisters, gasoline, and nails, a noxious but slipshod stew, suggesting the attackers were incapable of acquiring, let alone building, simple explosive devices. The doctors who carried out the attacks surely had violent intentions, but they lacked the capabil...

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“…Other studies have looked at learning from the perspective of groups, for example, with a focus on how recruits or converts acquire new knowledge and skills (Galonnier & de los Rios, 2016;Inge, 2016;Wiktorowicz, 2005), how charismatic leaders transmit their teachings to followers (Beekers, 2015;Gendron, 2017;Wali, 2017), or how groups learn from one another (Morrison, 2017;Ranstorp & Normark, 2015). One study suggests that terrorist learning occurs across diverse interdependent agents, including individuals, groups, and entire generations (Kettle & Mumford, 2017). Others focus more explicitly on intergenerational learning, for example, how children acquire religious or political beliefs and practices from older family members (Copeland, 2019;Horgan et al, 2017;Lee & Knott, 2016;Scourfield et al, 2013), or on intragenerational peer transmission and skill development (Everton, 2016;Lee & Knott, 2017;Maher, 2014).…”

“…Studies also differ on outcomes: on what is learned and for what ends. Accounts based in terrorism studies have generally examined strategic and tactical innovation (Dolnik, 2007;Jackson et al, 2005;Kettle & Mumford, 2017;Körner & Staller, 2018;Ranstorp & Normark, 2015), including terrorist training (Forest, 2006;Stenersen, 2013) and malevolent creativity (Gill et al, 2013), though the importance of ideology has been acknowledged by some (e.g. Dolnik, 2007;Drake, 1998) along with the broader role of knowledge acquisition and sharing (e.g.…”

“…Dolnik, 2007;Drake, 1998) along with the broader role of knowledge acquisition and sharing (e.g. Forest, 2006;Kettle & Mumford, 2017;Ranstorp & Normark, 2015). A minority of researchers have focused directly on ideological and social outcomes (e.g.…”

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“…Not specifically writing about terrorism, Mumford and Hunter develop a multi-level perspective on creativity attempting to identify the relationships between variables and innovation (Mumford and Hunter 2005). With regard to terrorist learning Kettle and Mumford (2017) propose a new analytical framework for terrorist learning, and Singh (2017) develops a preliminary typology that maps pathways of learning and innovation by modern jihadist groups. While these are important advances when it comes to the subject of terrorist learning, the broader literature on learning has been characterised by Bennett and Howlett, who suggest that the concept of learning is still "overtheorized and underapplied" (1992,288).…”

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