Terrorist Radiological Dispersive Device (RDD) Scenario and Cancer Risk Assessment

Yves, Thalis L. A. Saint; Cabral, Paulo A. M.; Brum, Tercio; Rother, Fagner C.; Alves, Paulo; Lauria, Dejanira da Costa; Andrade, Edson R.

doi:10.1080/10807039.2012.707926

Cited by 13 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Also, HotSpot was used to simulate the main scenario features and the initial screening not only for radiological releases but also for blasting and thermal radiation. Equations used from RERF were used to estimate cancer development arising from radiation exposure in such a scenario [21,22].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulated nuclear contamination scenario, solid cancer risk assessment, and support to decision

et al. 2019

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The detonation of an (hypothetical) improvised nuclear device (IND) can generate atmospheric release of radioactive material in the form of particles and dust that ultimately contaminate the soil. In this study, the detonation of an IND in an urban area was simulated, and its effects on humans were determined. The risk of solid cancer development due to radiation was calculated by taking into account prompt radiation and whole-body exposure of individuals near the detonation site up to 10 km. The excess relative risk (ERR) of developing solid cancer was evaluated by using the mathematical relationships from the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF) studies and those from the HotSpot code. The methodology consists of using output data obtained from simulations performed with the HotSpot health physics code plugging in such numbers into a specific given equation used by RERF to evaluate the resulting impact. Such a preliminary procedure is expected to facilitate the decision-making process significantly.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulated nuclear contamination scenario, solid cancer risk assessment, and support to decision

et al. 2019

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“…Typically, an RDD is an explosive device coupled with radioactive material. The explosion adds an immediate threat to human life and property beyond the probable main purpose of the RDD (Saint Yves et al, 2012). The Toxicology andIndustrial Health, Volume 34, Issue 6, 2018, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The HotSpot Health Physics code was used to simulate an intentional radioactive dispersion caused by detonation of a radiological (non-nuclear) dispersive device (RDD). A typical RDD uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material, creating contamination and terrorism (Ring, 2004;Saint Yves et al, 2012). For solid cancers, high doses are necessary to increase the risk significantly above the spontaneous risk, however, for leukemia high relative risks may occur even at low doses (IAEA, 1996).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Typically, an RDD is an explosive device coupled with radioactive material. The explosion adds an immediate threat to human life and property beyond the probable main purpose of the RDD (Saint Yves et al, 2012). The combination of blast injuries and radiological contamination can be problematic if procedures to address blast and radiation have only been considered separately.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Support to triage and public risk perception considering long-term response to a Cs-137 radiological dispersive device scenario

Andrade

Souza

Camerini³

et al. 2018

Toxicol Ind Health

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A radiological dispersive device (RDD) spreads radioactive material, complicates the treatment of physical injuries, raises cancer risk, and induces disproportionate fear. Simulating such an event enables more effective and efficient utilization of the triage and treatment resources of staff, facilities, and space. Fast simulation can give detail on events in progress or future events. The resources for triage and treatment of contaminated trauma victims can differ for pure exposure individuals, while discouraging the "worried well" from presenting in the crisis phase by media announcement would relieve pressure on hospital facilities. The proposed methodology integrates capabilities from different platforms in a convergent way composed of three phases: (a) scenario simulation, (b) data generation, and (c) risk assessment for triage focused on follow-up epidemiological assessment. Simulations typically indicate that most of the affected population does not require immediate medical assistance. Medical triage for the few severely injured and the radiological triage to diminish the contamination with radioactivity will always be the priority. For this study, however, higher priorities should be given to individuals from radiological "warm" and "hot" zones as required by risk criteria. The proposed methodology could thus help to (a) filter and reduce the number of individuals to be attended, (b) optimize the prioritization of medical care,

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“…A small amount of radioactive material may be spread over an area to cause harm, disruption, and environmental contamination. The explosion of such a device is not usually intended to produce a considerable amount of debris, though it can happen in some cases in the vicinity of the explosion site . For this work, the spread of radiological material was achieved by a small amount of explosive.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Radiological Risk Assessment by Convergence Methodology Model in RDD Scenarios

et al. 2016

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A radiological dispersal device (RDD) is a simple weapon capable of causing human harm, environmental contamination, disruption, area denial, and economic cost. It can affect small, large, or long areas depending on atmospheric stability. The risk of developing a radio-induced cancer depends on exposure, and an effective response depends upon available timely guidance. This article proposes and demonstrates a convergence of three different capabilities to assess risk and support rapid safe resource efficient response. The three capabilities that are integrated are Hotspot for dispersion, RERF for epidemiological risk, and RESRAD-RDD for response guidance. The combined methodology supports decisions on risk reduction and resource allocation through work schedules, the designation and composition of response teams, and siting for operations. In the illustrative RDD scenario, the contamination area for sheltering, evacuation, and long-term public concern was greatest for calm atmospheric conditions, whilst close-quarter responders faced highest dose rates for neutral atmospheric conditions. Generally, the risks to women responders were found to be significantly greater than for men, and the risks to 20-year-old responders were three times that of their 60-year-old counterparts for similar exposure.

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Terrorist Radiological Dispersive Device (RDD) Scenario and Cancer Risk Assessment

Cited by 13 publications

References 13 publications

Simulated nuclear contamination scenario, solid cancer risk assessment, and support to decision

Simulated nuclear contamination scenario, solid cancer risk assessment, and support to decision

Support to triage and public risk perception considering long-term response to a Cs-137 radiological dispersive device scenario

Radiological Risk Assessment by Convergence Methodology Model in RDD Scenarios

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