TFDD: A trust-based framework for reliable data delivery and DoS defense in VANETs

Kerrache, Chaker Abdelaziz; Lagraa, Nasreddine; Calafate, Carlos T.; Lakas, Abderrahmane

doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2016.11.010

Cited by 55 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…In the proposed algorithm, the algorithm TFDD is used to defend against DOS. The distinguishing characteristics of this method is using trust‐based system and not using coding methods.…”

Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An evolutionary game theory–based security model in vehicular ad hoc networks

Zahedi

Farzaneh

2020

Int J Communication

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Summary The word population is growing on a daily basis; consequently, the growth of commute and transport, developing efficient and intelligent transportation systems (ITS), has become one of the most popular requirements and the most significant attempts in modern urban areas containing large population. A key component of intelligent transportation systems is a vehicular ad hoc network. Devising internet‐based practical programs such as awareness of climatic conditions, geographical location, practical programs like on‐line payment services in the vehicular ad hoc network has led to safer driving, prevention of deadly accidents, transportation improvement, more welfare and convenience for passengers, and even offering more commercial opportunities. The special features of vehicular ad hoc network, such as intense activity, constantly‐changing topology, the vehicles' high speed, etc, will lead to challenges in gaining security. Therefore, providing vehicular ad hoc networks with security is of extreme importance in terms of users' anonymity, identification, and data privacy. In this paper, a security model is presented using a method based on evolutionary games. This method, in every vehicle, is applied as a node in the network while interacting with other vehicles; it aims at distinguishing some common attacks and defending against attackers. In this method, defending (honest) vehicles and attacking vehicles take part in an asymmetrical game; each vehicle aims at gaining the most utility and achieving its goals. The proposed method is simulated using various scenarios. The simulation results reveal that the proposed method is efficient and it reaches equilibrium and convergence at the end of the game in each scenario.

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“…In the proposed algorithm, the algorithm TFDD is used to defend against DOS. The distinguishing characteristics of this method is using trust‐based system and not using coding methods.…”

Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Formula 16 is based on the algorithms used in the simulation. In the proposed algorithm, the TFDD algorithm was used to deal with the DOS attack. The obvious feature of this approach is to use a trust‐based system and not to use cryptographic methods.…”

Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary game theory–based security model in vehicular ad hoc networks

Zahedi

Farzaneh

2020

Int J Communication

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“…9,10 (3) Various attacks, if malicious vehicles link ability to normal vehicle, cheat the message receiver by altering the trust management of the event message; a vehicle will be misled due to too many malicious vehicles forwarding the event message to maintain bogus messages and against the normal messages. [11][12][13] (4) Pseudonym expiry is also another problem of the current trust management systems. 15,16,18,19,21,43 If RS make a decision immediately, they might lose important messages that would have helped them to make a better decision; moreover, if RS delay decision making, they might receive some incorrect event messages.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The same trick used to support bogus event message can still work . (3) Various attacks, if malicious vehicles link ability to normal vehicle, cheat the message receiver by altering the trust management of the event message; a vehicle will be misled due to too many malicious vehicles forwarding the event message to maintain bogus messages and against the normal messages . (4) Pseudonym expiry is also another problem of the current trust management systems .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

MADPTM: Mix zones and dynamic pseudonym trust management system for location privacy

Memon

Mirza

2018

Int J Communication

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Summary In intelligent transportation systems, the messages transmitted and received from one vehicle to another vehicle may enhance location privacy scheme; falsification message forwarding collusion attack, timing, and transition attacks all are serious issues and must be addressed in event trust management. Without which, decision making on event message may endanger the whole transportation system and may even threat the human life. In addition, pseudonym expiry is another critical issue of location privacy. The time interval of decision waiting even has been the critical accident response time. In this paper, we proposed a new novel mix zones and dynamic pseudonym trust management system, called MADPTM, which aims to prevent against attackers under privacy‐enhanced road networks. On shortening the pseudonym expiry, we propose dynamic pseudonym trust management system, with the assistance of reported server. We performed a set of simulations under many trust attack models to evaluate the performance and efficiency of the proposed system. Our proposed MADPTM method proved to be highly resilient to various attacks, and simulation results verified that our method outperforms other existing methods.

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“…Hasrouny et al [88] propose to calculate trust values of the vehicles that can limit the number of accepted received messages from neighbors -if a certain threshold is exceeded (which will be the case in DoS attack), a report is sent to the trusted entity, say misbehavior authority (MA) [34], to deactivate the attacker. The TFDD framework [89] can detect DoS and DDoS attacks in a distributed manner by trust establishment between vehicles. Each vehicle maintains local and global parameters (e.g., neighbor id, various message counters, trust score) in order to include/exclude neighbours from a local or global black-list.…”

Section: A Dos Detection/mitigationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication Platforms

Hasan

Mohan

Shimizu

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Intell. Veh.

175

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Modern vehicular wireless technology enables vehicles to exchange information at any time, from any place, to any network -forms the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication platforms. Despite benefits, V2X applications also face great challenges to security and privacy -a very valid concern since breaches are not uncommon in automotive communication networks and applications. In this survey, we provide an extensive overview of V2X ecosystem. We also review main security/privacy issues, current standardization activities and existing defense mechanisms proposed within the V2X domain. We then identified semantic gaps of existing security solutions and outline possible open issues.We also discuss possible open issues (Section VIII), summarize multiple industry/academic/government initiatives for securing V2X communications (Section IX-A) and compare our work with related surveys (Section IX-B). II. V2X PLATFORM : AN OVERVIEWThis section provides an overview of V2X communication interfaces (Section II-A) and discuss various network/communication models (Section II-B). A. Communication InterfacesThe internal architecture of a vehicle is interconnected with ECUs (electronic control units -embedded computing platform that monitor/control automotive systems) coupled with sensors and actuators. The communication between the vehicle and the outside world such as other vehicles or roadside units (RSUs) is performed via external interfaces (see Fig. 1). These vehicular external interfaces are attached to the telematics control unit (TCU) -also referred to as on-board unit (OBU) 1 -an ECU that provides wireless connectivity [7], [8]. A vehicle control unit coordinates with the OBU to collect and disseminate vehicular data [9]. The current standards for V2X communication are DSRC (dedicated short range communication) [10] in the United States, C-ITS (cooperative intelligent transport systems) [11] in Europe and ITS Connect [12] in Japan. Both DSRC and C-ITS operating in the 5.9 GHz ITS band while ITS Connect operating in 760 MHz band (refer to Section II-B1 for details). An alternative to DSRC/C-ITS is the next generation of cellular wireless mobile telecommunications technology (see Section II-B2). OBUs can also be equipped with interfaces for long-range communication. These long-range wireless channels can be classified as broadcast channels (signals can be broadcast to multiple vehicles without knowledge of the receiver's address) and addressable channels (where messages are sent to vehicles with specific addresses.) [13]. Examples of broadcast channels include the global navigation satellite system (GNSS), traffic message/satellite radio receivers, etc. Addressable channels are typically used for long-range voice/data transmissions and are intended to be used for cellular communications for mobile broadband [8].

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TFDD: A trust-based framework for reliable data delivery and DoS defense in VANETs

Cited by 55 publications

References 38 publications

An evolutionary game theory–based security model in vehicular ad hoc networks

An evolutionary game theory–based security model in vehicular ad hoc networks

MADPTM: Mix zones and dynamic pseudonym trust management system for location privacy

Securing Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) Communication Platforms

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