The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?

Elzinga, Kenneth G.

doi:10.1086/466659

Cited by 50 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…Elzinga (1969), Pfunder, Plaine andWhittemore (1972) and Rogowsky (1986) use a methodology that is based on classifying ordered remedies as successful, sufficient, deficient, or unsuccessful depending on whether they fulfill certain criteria. While Elzinga (1969) argues that only one out of ten cases can be classified as successful or sufficient, the success rate in Rogowsky's (1986) sample increases to four out of ten. 7 Ellert (1976) is the first study that looks at valuation effects of anti-merger complaints.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

How Effective is European Merger Control?

2008

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This paper applies a novel methodology to a unique dataset of large concentrations during the period 1990-2002 to assess merger control's effectiveness. By using data gathered from several sources and employing different evaluation techniques, we analyze the economic effects of the European Commission's (EC) merger control decisions and distinguish between blockings, clearances with commitments (either behavioral or structural), and outright clearances. We run an event study on merging and rival firms' stocks to quantify the profitability effects of mergers and merger control decisions. We back up our results and methodology by using alternative measures for the merger's profitability effects based on balance-sheet data and obtain consistent results. Our findings suggest that outright blockings solve the competitive problems generated by the merger. Remedies are not always effective in solving the market power concerns, at least not on average. Nevertheless, both structural (divestitures) and behavioral remedies do help restore effective competition when correctly applied to anticompetitive mergers during the first investigation phase. Yet, they are on the whole ineffective or even detrimental when applied after the second investigation phase. Finally, remediesespecially behavioral ones -seem to constitute a rent transfer from merging firms to rivals when mistakenly applied to pro-competitive mergers.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

How Effective is European Merger Control?

2008

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“…On the other hand, the 'essential facilities doctrine' and the doctrine of 'unilateral action' may just be the most recent examples of the shopworn ideas antitrust economists periodically reinvent in order to support plaintiffs' pleas for protection from the forces of unfettered market competition. Elzinga's (1969) conclusion that the remedies imposed in Section 7 cases have not placed significant constraints on the behavior of the parties involved is contained in Ellert (1976) and Rogowsky (1986Rogowsky ( , 1987. The evidence that the antitrust penalties are often ineffective has an important implication for the efficacy of antitrust policy .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monopoly and the problem of the economists

Shughart¹

1996

Manage. Decis. Econ.

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By any measure economists have played increasingly prominent roles in antitrust policy making, at least since the early 1970s. Indeed, the approach to the analysis of public policy toward business pioneered by Chicago school economists dominates the academic literature nowadays. According to the Chicago school's adherents, their insistence that antitrust be examined through the lens of price theory should have produced discernably ‘better’ (read pro‐consumer) laws and ‘better’ law enforcement. This paper contends that economists have in fact not had a positive influence on antitrust policy, but have instead actively contributed to its use as a way of subverting competitive market forces.

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“…While the ex-post evaluation of U.S. antitrust policy in general, and merger policy in particular, has attracted the interest of both academics and practitioners for the last few decades (see, e.g., Elzinga (1969), Stillman (1983), Baker (2003) or Federal Trade Commission (1999), the topic recently also gained in importance in the European Union. This increasing interest is not only reflected in more academic contributions on the topic -such as Davies and Lyons (2007) Limiting our review of the related literature to the evaluation of merger enforcement in the European Union, we found that the European Commission (2015) proposes a further differentiation in (1) studies analyzing merger decision outcomes, and (2) studies evaluating the impact of merger regulations and policies.…”

Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

2015

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. THE DURATION OF THE EC MERGER CONTROL PROCESS AbstractThe duration of merger proceedings held by competition authorities is an important determinant of the efficiency of the entire merger control process. We use a dataset of 2953 Phase I and 92 Phase II investigations completed by the European Commission (EC) between 1999 and 2008 to examine the key determinants of their duration. Differentiating between authority-and caserelated drivers, we find that while the duration of Phase I investigations largely depends on the type of decision and use of simplified procedure, the duration of Phase II investigations is driven by factors such as industry knowledge, the duration of the preceding Phase I investigation, the origin of the notifying firm or the number of identified relevant markets. We also provide evidence that the significant increase in average duration identified after the 2004 merger regulation reform does not imply a decrease in administrative efficiency, as the probability of indepth investigations was correspondingly reduced.

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The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?

Cited by 50 publications

References 0 publications

How Effective is European Merger Control?

How Effective is European Merger Control?

Monopoly and the problem of the economists

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

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