The Baltic policy of Germany and current international relations

Abstract

This article analyses the Baltic policy of united Germany from the 1990s until today. The authors set out to identify the significance of German-Baltic relations and the role of the Eastern policy in Russian-German relations. The method of dynamic comparison between the political and economic narrative in intergovernmental relations makes it possible to identify distinctive features of Germany's Baltic policy in the context of current international relations. In particular, it is noted that Germany was most active in the Baltic region in the 1990s, when the country was establishing political, economic, and cultural ties with the new independent states. In the second half of the 1990s, Germany's foreign policy became less intense. After the accession of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the EU and NATO in 2004, certain disagreements started to arise between Germany and the Baltics. It explains the lukewarm relations between them. The Ukraine events brought about a change in Germany's regional policy. Despite Russia remaining one of the key economic and political counteractors, Germany, being a partner of the Baltics in the EU and NATO, cannot adopt a neutral position in the conflict of interests between the Baltics and Russia

Military and political cooperation between Germany and Lithuania in the late 2010s to early 2020s

“…Germany viewed this development as highly favourable and consequently utilized both military and political tools in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe more broadly. However, this approach stirred discontent among Lithuania and other regional players [10][11][12], with signs of increased irritation emerging even before 2014.…”

German Participation in the Three Seas Initiative: Opportunities for Russia

“…By this document, German leadership re affirmed their support to Kyiv, guaranteed uninterrupted transit of the Russian gas through the UrengoyPomaryUzhgorod gas pipeline and took on an obligation to establish and manage a Green Foundation for Ukraine, designed to promote the shift to renewable sources energy. Following that, Naftogaz, Ukranian national oil and gas company and RWE (RheinischWestfälisches Elektrizitätswerk), a German multinational energy company, signed a memorandum of understanding on hydrogen 20 .…”

“…In April 2021, representatives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany and the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation signed the "Joint Declaration of Intent on Sustainable Energy Cooperation", which includ ed, among others, hydrogen issue 23 . *** 20 Ukraine and Germany signed a memorandum of cooperation on the production of "green" hydrogen, URL: https://day.kyiv.ua/ru/news/220821ukrainaigermaniya podpisalimemorandumosotrudnichestvevnapravleniiproizvodstva (accessed 09.12.2021). 21 Joint Statement of the US and Germany on Support for Ukraine, European Energy Se curity, and our Climate Goals, URL: https://germania.diplo.de/ruru/aktuelles//2472194 (accessed 09.12.2021); Having intended to reduce Poland's dissatisfaction with the lifting of US sanctions on the operator company Nord Stream2, Germany supported 3SI in the Statement.…”

“…Timofeev and Khorolskaya explore the approaches to relations with Russia practiced within the FrenchGerman tandem and conclude that while the positions of Berlin and Paris coincide on political issues, they diverge when it comes to economics affecting the interests of either of the countries [19]. In their paper, Salikov, Tarasov, and Urazbaev specifically analyze the Baltic vector of German foreign policy and show how it affects Berlin's relations with Moscow [20].…”