The Best-Shot All-Pay (Group) Auction with Complete Information

Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A.; Topolyan, Iryna

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2326211

Cited by 8 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Turning to the group all‐pay auction, the focus of this study, Baik, Kim, and Na () and Topolyan () consider a perfect‐substitutes impact function and find free‐riding equilibria analogous to the logit‐type CSF results. Barbieri, Malueg, and Topolyan () consider a best‐shot impact function and derive conditions under which multiple players in each group may be active.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction

Chowdhury¹,

Lee²,

Topolyan

2016

Southern Economic Journal

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We investigate a group all-pay auction in which each groups effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group-specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi-pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction

Chowdhury¹,

Lee²,

Topolyan

2016

Southern Economic Journal

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“…Following the tradition in the literature on group contests with group‐specific public‐good prizes (e.g., Baik 2008; Barbieri, Malueg, and Topolyan 2014; Eliaz and Wu 2018; Esteban and Ray 2001), we assume that players on a team equally value the prize. The two teams, however, may differ in their players' valuations.…”

Section: A Model Of a Two‐period Team Contestmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is similar to the majority of studies of group contests based on imperfectly discriminatory contest models (Tullock contests), for example, Esteban and Ray (2001, 2008) and Nitzan and Ueda (2009, 2011). In contrast, Barbieri, Malueg, and Topolyan (2014); Chowdhury, Lee, and Topolyan (2017); and Chowdhury and Topolyan (2016) consider complete‐information perfectly discriminatory contests (all‐pay auctions), assuming that a team's overall output is determined by either the “best shot”—that is, the highest bid placed by its team member—or the “weakest link”—that is, the lowest bid placed within the team. It is interesting to explore dynamic team contests with other team production functions.…”

Section: Concluding Remarkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper belongs to the extensive literature on contests between groups or teams, including Skaperdas (1998); Nitzan (1991); Baik (1993, 2008); Esteban and Ray (2001, 2008); Nitzan and Ueda (2009, 2011); Münster (2007, 2009); Konrad and Leininger (2007); Konrad and Kovenock (2009); Barbieri, Malueg, and Topolyan (2014); Chowdhury, Lee, and Topolyan (2017); Chowdhury and Topolyan (2016); Eliaz and Wu (2018) and Barbieri, Konrad, and Malueg (forthcoming). All of these studies assume that group/team members simultaneously contribute their efforts, which are translated into a single aggregate bid through a production function.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests

2020

Economic Inquiry

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We study equilibrium player ordering in a dynamic all‐pay contest between two teams. The contest lasts two periods, and each team consists of two players who perform in different periods on behalf of their teams. The team with the higher aggregate output wins the prize, which is a public good to its players. Each team has one stronger player and one weaker player, and the two teams can differ in their values of the prize. The teams maximize their winning odds by strategically assigning their players to different periods. We find that when the intrateam heterogeneity in player ability is not excessive, the teams would allocate their stronger players to the late positions as the “anchormen.” When both the intrateam ability gap and interteam heterogeneity in teams' values become excessively large, the team with high value always places its stronger player in the early position, who will place a large bid to preempt late competition. (JEL C7, D7, D8)

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“…This paper is related to Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg (), Ursprung (), Baik (), Riaz, Shogren, and Johnson (), Baik and Shogren (), Baik, Kim, and Na (), Baik (), Epstein and Mealem (), Lee (), Kolmar and Rommeswinkel (), Chowdhury, Lee, and Sheremeta (), Topolyan (), and Barbieri, Malueg, and Topolyan (). These papers study contests in which groups of players compete to win a single prize and the prize is a public good only within each group .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contests with Alternative Public‐Good Prizes

Baik

2016

J Public Economic Theory

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I study contests in which a society of players compete, by expending irreversible effort, over which one of alternative prizes should be awarded to them by the decision maker. The prizes are public goods and/or public bads for the players. The players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. I define each player's valuation spread as the difference between his valuations for the two public‐good/public‐bad prizes. I establish that the players' equilibrium effort levels depend solely on their valuation spreads, and that the players never expend positive effort for both prizes in equilibrium. Further, I establish that in equilibrium only players with the widest positive valuation spread and players with the widest negative valuation spread expend positive effort. Finally, I establish that the equilibrium effort level expended for each prize and the equilibrium total effort level are determined only by the widest positive valuation spread and the widest negative valuation spread.

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The Best-Shot All-Pay (Group) Auction with Complete Information

Cited by 8 publications

References 42 publications

The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction

The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction

On Equilibrium Player Ordering in Dynamic Team Contests

Contests with Alternative Public‐Good Prizes

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