The chilling trade effects of antidumping proliferation

Vandenbussche, Hylke; Zanardi, Maurizio

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.01.003

Cited by 135 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…While we do not directly test for sunk costs, our results can be interpreted in light of the literature on heterogeneous firms and sunk costs of trade (Melitz 2003). Vandenbussche and Zanardi's (2010) results are consistent with this concern. We have shown AD causes trade relationships to fail and we have also found a lower likelihood of a return.…”

Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 83%

The Hazardous Effects of Antidumping

Besedeš

Prusa

2016

Economic Inquiry

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We investigate the extent to which antidumping actions eliminate trade altogether. Using quarterly 10-digit HS-level export data for products involved in U.S. antidumping cases we find that antidumping actions increase the hazard rate by more than 50%. We find strong evidence of investigation effects with the impact during the initiation and preliminary duty phases considerably larger than once final duties are imposed. There are also important differences with respect to the size of duties with cases with large duties experiencing very large investigation effects. We show the antidumping (AD)-affected countries are less likely to return to the market even after the AD order is removed. (JEL F13, F14) * We would like to thank seminar and conferences participants at

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Section: Figurementioning

confidence: 83%

The Hazardous Effects of Antidumping

Besedeš

Prusa

2016

Economic Inquiry

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“…Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2011) contradict the proponents of AD measures. According to these proponents the outcome on trade flows are negligible because AD involves very specific products, small volumes and values.…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Anti-dumping Dutiesmentioning

confidence: 80%

“…5 The lobby for the AD, however, also occurs in an indirect way. The existence of oligopolistic structures increases the likelihood of an AD and, once imposed, AD limits international trade overall (Vandenbussche and Zanardi, 2011). Thus, if a certain company petitions for and is contemplated with the AD duty in a given country, this indirectly benefits companies of the same sector in different countries, which trade in world markets.…”

Section: The Political Economy Of Anti-dumping Dutiesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Industrial determinants of anti-dumping in Brazil – Protection, competition and performance: An analysis with binary dependent variable and panel data

Oliveira

2014

EconomiA

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This article investigates how sectorial characteristics determine the probability of industries receiving an anti-dumping (AD) duty, delving into the economic literature on the political economy of protection, market competition and trade reform in Brazil. By focusing on when the AD was granted, the article concentrates on the objective economic motivations for an industry to claim protection and which are instrumental to the decision of the trade defense authority. The empirical strategy involves a panel of 93 industrial sectors from 1996 to 2007 to create four groups of explanatory variables (collective action/competition, economic performance, factors of production, trade coefficients), reflecting their structural characteristics, market competition, economic performance and political mobilization. The econometric specifications apply binary dependent variable models (logit) with cluster robust and population-averaged error correction. The results show that structure of trade (imports volume and tariffs), economic performance (productivity and investments), and factor content (labor and natural resources) influence the probability of the AD. Political economy characteristics (captured by interactive terms) are also influential in determining the measure. ResumoEsse artigo investiga como características industriais afetam a probabilidade de indústrias receberem direitos anti-dumping (AD), relacionando literaturas de economia política da proteção, concorrência nos mercados e reforma comercial no Brasil. Ao focar nos casos em que o AD foi concedido, o artigo explica as motivações econômicas objetivas para uma indústria pleitear a proteção e que contribuem para a decisão favorável da autoridade de defesa comercial. A estratégia empírica envolve um painel de 93 setores industriais entre 1996 a 2007 para criar quatro grupos de variáveis explicativas (ação coletiva/concorrência, desempenho econômico, fatores de produção, coeficientes de comércio), refletindo as características estruturais, desempenho econômico e mobilização política. As especificações econométricas utilizam modelos de regressões de variável dependente binária (logit) com correção de erros por painel-robusto (panel-robust) e por ponderação por população (population averaged). Os resultados mostram 207 que estrutura do comércio (volume de importações e tarifas), desempenho econômico (produtividade e investimentos), e conteúdo dos fatores (trabalho e recursos naturais) influenciam a probabilidade do AD. Características de economia política (capturados por termos de interação) são também importantes para a determinação da medida.

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“…Table contains our benchmark results. Because the AD behavior of traditional and new users is dramatically different and there is evidence (e.g., Vandenbussche and Zanardi ) that the intensity of current AD use has important implications for future AD use, we present our results splitting the sample into traditional and new users. The first two columns focus on the behavior of traditional users, while the last two columns look at the new users of AD.…”

Section: Empirical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Antidumping Echoing

Tabakis¹,

Zanardi

2016

Economic Inquiry

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This article documents that antidumping (AD) “echoing” (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD. We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import‐competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political‐economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political‐economy‐driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation. (JEL F12, F13, F14)

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The chilling trade effects of antidumping proliferation

Cited by 135 publications

References 48 publications

The Hazardous Effects of Antidumping

The Hazardous Effects of Antidumping

Industrial determinants of anti-dumping in Brazil – Protection, competition and performance: An analysis with binary dependent variable and panel data

Antidumping Echoing

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