2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.00804.x
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The Choices for Europe: National Preferences in New and Old Member States*

Abstract: Drawing on the existing body of literature that deals with national preference formation and building on the role played by vulnerability and deficits in shaping policy choices at the European level, this article provides a synthetic framework to explain the stances of the Older Member States (OMS) and New Member States (NMS). We subsequently apply the model to NMS, focusing largely, although not exclusively, on Poland. We argue that although many of the policy preferences can be explained by the framework, th… Show more

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Cited by 24 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Small western European countries, like the Netherlands or Belgium, have a lot more firms engaging in Brussels than EE states. Conversely, Poland, although it perceives itself as ‘big and important’ (Copsey and Haughton, ), is not much more active in EU‐level corporate lobbying than Hungary.…”
Section: Lobbying: the Privilege Or Burden Of The Economic Elite?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Small western European countries, like the Netherlands or Belgium, have a lot more firms engaging in Brussels than EE states. Conversely, Poland, although it perceives itself as ‘big and important’ (Copsey and Haughton, ), is not much more active in EU‐level corporate lobbying than Hungary.…”
Section: Lobbying: the Privilege Or Burden Of The Economic Elite?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton argue that the perceived vulnerabilities of member states, such as historical experience, size, economic position, shape their preferences in the EU-in the case of Germany in particular, the events of the twentieth century led to its strong commitment to European integration. 61 At a time when Germany has considerable (economic) power, German leaders are attempting to reassert and prove their commitment to a common European project. If Germany needed indirect institutional power to be considered "less threatening" in postwar and post-reunification Europe, then that is still the case in the context of the Eurozone crisis.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…National preferences and interests of EU member states are shaped by a broad range of factors, including (perceived) size, geography, economy, historical experience, domestic politics, institutional settings -such as coordination of EU policy-making -, external alliances, international developments and perceived national vulnerabilities and weaknesses (Bilčík 2010;Copsey and Haughton 2009;Wong and Hill 2011). As Wong and Hill (2011, 3) point out, national preferences and interests also 'reflect a country's sense of national identity, including its basic values and perceptions of what it stands for in the world' .…”
Section: Continued Centrality Of National Sovereigntymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Wong and Hill (2011, 3) point out, national preferences and interests also 'reflect a country's sense of national identity, including its basic values and perceptions of what it stands for in the world' . In the case of the EU member states that were part of the Soviet bloc or Soviet Union, national preferences and interests in the area of foreign policy are strongly influenced by the experience of and the security and economic dependencies from the communist and Soviet era, as well as by the political geography of the countries' historical statehood (Bilčík 2010, 142;Copsey and Haughton 2009;Vilpišauskas 2011).…”
Section: Continued Centrality Of National Sovereigntymentioning
confidence: 99%