Scientific concepts are defined by metaphors. These metaphors determine what attention is and what count as adequate explanations of the phenomenon. The authors analyze these metaphors within 3 types of attention theories: (a) "cause" theories, in which attention is presumed to modulate information processing (e.g., attention as a spotlight; attention as a limited resource); (b) "effect" theories, in which attention is considered to be a by-product of information processing (e.g., the competition metaphor); and (c) hybrid theories that combine cause and effect aspects (e.g., biasedcompetition models). The present analysis reveals the crucial role of metaphors in cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the efforts of scientists to find a resolution to the classic problem of cause versus effect interpretations.Everyone knows what attention is. (William James, 1890/1950 No one knows what attention is, and . . . there may even not be an "it" there to be known about (although of course there might be). (Pashler, 1998, p. 1) The history of attention research is not just an ongoing debate about how to explain the phenomena of attention. It is equally a debate about what attention is. It is widely recognized in contemporary philosophy of science (Hanson, 1958;Hesse, 1966;Kuhn, 1962) that our scientific theories determine what we regard as data, how we individuate phenomena, and what the criteria for an adequate explanation should be. The phenomena are not just "given" in some theory-independent fashion. Rather, our theories and concepts partly determine what we will take the relevant phenomena to be, and they thus determine what a good theory must account for.This fact is quite evident in the field of attention research, in which even a cursory survey reveals that there is no general agreement about what a theory of attention ought to explain. Different theories have different views of what counts as attention. Some theories, for example, assume that there is a specific mechanism of attention, and they then ask how it works. Is it a cognitive system made of interacting subcomponents discretely localized in the brain? Or is attention a pool of resources we allocate to effortful tasks? Other theories are skeptical that there is such a "thing" as attention. They view attention instead as an epiphenomenon of the workings of multiple independent cognitive systems. Thus, whereas some theories conceptualize attention as a real "cause" of various cognitive events, others view it as a mere "effect" of multiple cognitive operations.In this article, we argue that there is no way to identify attention independent of some theory of attention, and we argue that theories of attention are structured largely by conceptual metaphors. These metaphors provide the logic for our thinking and reasoning about the nature, structure, and processes of attention, and we cannot do without some set of metaphors, either in commonsense or in scientific models of the mind.