The Concept of Political Corruption

Navot, Doron

doi:10.2753/pin1099-9922160403

Cited by 16 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The idea that corruption persists because it fulfills political, social, and economic functions is one with a long historical pedigree, certainly longer than much contemporary corruption/anticorruption research acknowledges. Navot (, p. 359), for example, writes of a “lost epoch” of research on political corruption in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which he argues attempted “to move away from understanding political corruption in purely moralistic terms.” Arguably, the notion peaked in popularity a half a century ago, as it was a theme prominent in many works within the development of modernization theory; from the 1950s until the early 1970s, this dominant academic discourse on corruption maintained a “functionalist approach,” which essentially argued that corruption functions in positive ways and as a result facilitates both political and economic development (Osrecki, ).…”

Section: The Problem With Viewing Corruption As Only a “Problem”mentioning

confidence: 99%

Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

Marquette

Peiffer

2017

Governance

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A growing body of research argues that anticorruption efforts fail because of a flawed theoretical foundation, where collective action theory is said to be a better lens for understanding corruption than the dominant principal–agent theory. We unpack this critique and advance several new arguments. First, the application of collective action theory to the issue of corruption has been, thus far, incomplete. Second, a collective action theory‐based approach to corruption is in fact complementary to a principal–agent approach, rather than contradictory as is claimed. Third, applications of both theories have failed to recognize that corruption persists because it functions to provide solutions to problems. We conclude by arguing that anticorruption effectiveness is difficult to achieve because it requires insights from all three perspectives—principal–agent theory, collective action theory, and corruption as serving functions—which allows us to better understand how to harness the political will needed to fight corruption.

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Section: The Problem With Viewing Corruption As Only a “Problem”mentioning

confidence: 99%

Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

Marquette

Peiffer

2017

Governance

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“…Finding its roots in a long historical pedigree, the functionality perspective on corruption suggests that, for many, corruption serves specific social, economic and/or political functions, and because of this, proclivity to engage in corruption may be relatively unchanged by principal–agent theory‐inspired anticorruption efforts (Huntington, 1968; Khan, 2004, 2006; Leff, 1964; Marquette & Peiffer, 2018, 2019; Navot, 2014; Osrecki, 2017). In other words, corruption may persist even if principals are committed to implementing anticorruption reforms, because corruption works to solve the problems that principals and/or agents face.…”

Section: The Hmu As a “Conflicted Success” Storymentioning

confidence: 99%

Lessons from reducing bribery in Uganda’s health services

Peiffer

Armytage

Marquette

et al. 2021

Development Policy Review

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Motivation Bribery is common in Uganda’s health sector, with an estimated one in four Ugandans who engage with the sector being asked to pay a bribe for services in 2010. Health workers in the public sector are badly paid, while significant numbers of well‐trained health workers emigrate to find better‐paid work. However, between 2010 and 2015, estimated rates of bribery halved in Ugandan health services. Purpose Why did bribery in Uganda’s health service fall so much in the 2010s? What does this mean for anticorruption research and practice? Approach and methods In addition to reviewing relevant literature and documents, in‐depth semi‐structured interviews with service providers, users and experts were conducted in Uganda’s Central, Eastern and Western provinces. Findings The establishment of the Health Monitoring Unit (HMU) in 2009 has been a major factor in reducing bribery. It used highly visible, often controversial investigations based on a principal–agent approach to anticorruption. Its approach, however, also led to negative unintended consequences, including undermining morale among frontline health providers and probably also citizens’ trust in health services. It is moreover questionable if the HMU’s approach can be sustained. Policy Implications To tackle frontline bribery effectively and sustainably, and so enhance service delivery, anticorruption interventions must consider the underlying functions and needs—such as compensating frontline staff for low wages—that bribery may help fill. Otherwise controls on corruption may result in more harm than the good they do in reducing corruption.

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“…In order to address these issues, typologies have been often used to better distinguish corrupt behaviors not only on the basis of specific mechanisms, attributes, procedures and sectors, but also in relation to precise personal attitudes and motivations. The most common classifications of corruption are those distinguishing between grand and petty corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), administrative and political corruption (Gould, 1991;Huberts, 1998;Navot, 2014, Holmes, 2015OECD, 2015;World Bank, 2003), illegal and legal corruption (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011;Maciel & De Sousa, 2018); the type of gain (tangible or intangible) involved in the transaction (UNODC, 2006;OECD, 2007;OECD, 2008;Villeneuve et al, 2019) and the principal's or agent's motivation for participating in the transaction (collusive vs. extortionary corruption) (Bauhr & Grimes, 2017;Jancsics, 2019;Ryvkin et al, 2017).…”

Section: Challenges In Defining and Measuring Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring sustainable development goals and the quest for high‐quality indicators: Learning from a practical evaluation of data on corruption

Mugellini

Villeneuve

Heide

2021

Sustainable Development

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Tracing progress in implementing the sustainable development goals (SDGs) is at the core of pushing and accounting for change. However, monitoring SDGs is challenged by a lack of purpose-fit and high-quality indicators based on data that are collected through a sound methodology, generated regularly, comparable over time, and publicly accessible. Assessing and improving the quality of existing data is essential for helping countries to generate an evidence base for action. General criteria for evaluating data quality are already available at the national and international level but their practical operationalization for the assessment of specific SDGs indicators is still underdeveloped. Taking target 16.5 as a case study, this paper evaluates the quality of existing corruption surveys and their relevance for SDGs. Results show that the main challenges concern data validity (they measure only one aspect of corruption), comparability (they use culturally biased definitions), periodicity (they are not regularly developed), and raw-data accessibility. This paper develops an original framework for benchmarking the overall methodological quality of existing corruption metrics. This framework can be used beyond the immediate context of corruption measurement and SDGs assessment. The same logic and methodology can, indeed, be employed to evaluate the quality of other metrics and support national governments and practitioners in identifying the informational and methodological gaps to be addressed in order to improve and make the best use of available statistical information.

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The Concept of Political Corruption

Cited by 16 publications

References 19 publications

Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

Lessons from reducing bribery in Uganda’s health services

Monitoring sustainable development goals and the quest for high‐quality indicators: Learning from a practical evaluation of data on corruption

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