The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter‐specific Truth

List, Christian; Spiekermann, Kai

doi:10.1002/9781118609378.ch10

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…A similar conclusion may be drawn with respect to majoritarianism. Miller (1986: 177-183) and also List and Spiekermann (2016) present CJT-based arguments that build upon majoritarianism. They discuss only decisions in which the whole electorate is invited to cast a vote.…”

Section: Grasping the First Horn Of The Metaethical Dilemma?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy

Schamberger

2021

Economics and Philosophy

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Epistemic democracy aims to show, often by appeal to the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that democracy has a high chance of reaching correct decisions. It has been argued that epistemic democracy is compatible with various metaethical accounts, such as moral realism, conventionalism and majoritarianism. This paper casts doubt on that thesis and reveals the following metaethical dilemma: if we adopt moral realism, it is doubtful that voters are, on average, more than 0.5 likely to track moral facts and identify the correct alternative. By contrast, if we adopt conventionalism or majoritarianism, we cannot expect that voters are both competent and sincere. Either way, the conditions for the application of Condorcet’s theorem are not met.

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Section: Grasping the First Horn Of The Metaethical Dilemma?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy

Schamberger

2021

Economics and Philosophy

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“…10) independently linked diverging standards to social epistemology in a democratic setup. This idea was later formalized by List and Spiekermann (2016). The idea of epistemic solidarity stems from Goodin and Spiekermann (2015), but they only look at a static setting in which both groups know who their peers are.…”

Section: Finding Your True Epistemic Peersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic network injustice

Spiekermann

2019

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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To find out what is in one’s own best interest, it is helpful to ask one’s epistemic peers. However, identifying one’s epistemic peers is not a trivial task. I consider a stylized political setting, an electoral competition of ‘Masses’ and ‘Elites’. To succeed, the Masses need to know which alternative on offer is truly in their interest. To find out, the Masses can pool their privately held information in a pre-election ballot, provided that they can reliably find out with whom they should pool information. I investigate the process of finding the relevant peer group for information pooling by modelling this group formation process as dynamic network change. The simulations show that the Masses can succeed in finding the right peers, but they also suggest reasons why the Elites may often be more successful. This phenomenon generalizes to the notion of Epistemic Network Injustice. Such injustice arises when a subset of citizens is systematically deprived of connections to helpful epistemic peers, leading to their reduced political influence. Epistemic Network Injustice is a new form of epistemic injustice, related to but distinct from the notion introduced by Miranda Fricker.

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Epistemic Democracy

Cerovac

2020

Epistemic Democracy and Political Legitimacy

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The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter‐specific Truth

Cited by 5 publications

References 12 publications

The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy

The metaethical dilemma of epistemic democracy

Epistemic network injustice

Epistemic Democracy

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