This paper addresses the question what level of detail is required in internal representa tions used in control of multi-joint movements, focusing on contact control tasks. Following Bernstein, we define the central problem to be which strategies are used in the nervous system in order to control the vastly redundant musculoskeletal system. Simplifications based on equilibrium point theories are rejected on the basis that when they are simple they do not lead to adequate behaviour, whereas when they are complex they implicitly introduce the detailed internal representations that they were meant to dispense with. Based on both experimental data and on simulation results, it is argued that timing of muscle activation needs to be precisely tuned to the task at hand and the environmental conditions. It is argued that it is impossible to achieve this without detailed internal representations of the properties of the effector system in relation to the environment. It is attempted to link Bernstein's notion of a hierarchical organization of the nervous system in which tasks are delegated to subsystems as low as possible in the hierarchical structure of the central nervous system, to recent advances in neuroscience. G.. I van Ingen Schenau et al./H um an Movement Science 14 (1995)
1, IntroductionMulti-joint movements are not realized by simply stringing together the movements in the joints involved. D ue to mechanical coupling and the action of poly-articular muscles, motions in one joint affect those in many others as well. Moreover, a human subject moving on one or two feet in a gravitational field can be considered as a highly unstable interlinked inverted pendulum controlled by a redundant set of actuators which are far from ideal force generators. This enormous complexity o f our action system was convincingly discussed already half a century ago by Bernstein (e.g., Bernstein, 1967). Based on his inspiring work and further stimulated by Gibson (e.g., Gibson, 1979) who stressed the guiding role of environmental information on the control of actions, many have tried to identify simplify ing principles in the organisation of movement control.Especially among ecological psychologists the idea o f detailed internal representations or motor programs has been disputed over the past decade (see Meijer and Roth, 1988 for discussion of this and related issues in the motor-action controversy). Since, indeed, it appears very unlikely that the central nervous system contains motor programs that deal with all details necessary to realize all variants of any movement observed in various environmental conditions, we sympathise with what has been defined by Turvey as "Round I of theorising on Bernstein's problem: how to minimize the executive responsibility of the CNS" (Turvey, 1990). We have consider able problems, however, with his " Round II" of theorising where selforganisation is proposed as a general principle underlying the organisation of all types of movement (Turvey, 1990; see also Kelso and Tuller, 1984; Schö...