The Copeland rule and Condorcet?s principle

Klamler, Christian

doi:10.1007/s00199-004-0467-7

Cited by 21 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…We have made an extensive discussion of properties with a particular attention to the analysis of societies that are divided into disjoint parts that produce the same collective decision; here and elsewhere we concluded that the Borda benchmark permits a much better aggregative behavior than Copeland. Besides, our model reconciles the measurement of magnitudes of (dis)agreement of preferences with social choice theory in the vein of earlier works like: Kemeny (1959), who proposes a social welfare ordering that maximizes the probability of agreement with a randomly selected member of the group; Baigent (1987), who shows that social welfare functions that verify certain proximity preservation property cannot both respect unanimity and be anonymous (see also Baigent, 1989;Nitzan, 1989;Klamler, 2005) . They argue that cohesiveness should be higher at the following profile P than at P : z P y P x 1 .…”

Section: Related Literature and Concluding Remarkssupporting

confidence: 72%

Consensus and the Act of Voting

Alcantud¹,

Calle²,

Cascón³

2013

Studies in Microeconomics

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Section: Related Literature and Concluding Remarkssupporting

confidence: 72%

Consensus and the Act of Voting

Alcantud¹,

Calle²,

Cascón³

2013

Studies in Microeconomics

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“…To date, the most complete list of distance-rationalizable rules is provided by Meskanen and Nurmi (2008) (but see also Baigent (1987); Klamler (2005bKlamler ( , 2005a). There, the authors show how to distance-rationalize many voting rules, including, among others, Plurality, Borda, Veto, Copeland, Dodgson, Kemeny, Slater, and STV.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distance rationalization of voting rules

Elkind

Faliszewski²,

Slinko

2015

Soc Choice Welf

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The concept of distance rationalizability allows one to define new voting rules or "rationalize" existing ones via a consensus class of elections and a distance. A candidate is declared an election winner if she is the consensus candidate in one of the nearest consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules are defined or can be represented in this way. In this paper, we focus on the power and the limitations of the distance rationalizability approach. We first show that if we do not place any restrictions on the class of consensus profiles or possible distances then essentially all voting rules become distance-rationalizable. Thus, to make the concept of distance ratioanalizability meaningful, we have to restrict the class of distances involved. To this end, we present a very natural class of distances, which we call votewise distances. We investigate which voting rules can be rationalized via votewise distances and study the properties of such rules and study their relations with rules that are maximumlikelyhood estimators.

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“…This closeness must be measured by a distance function since violations of the triangle inequality may lead to undesirable effects. These ideas has been explored by several authors (Baigent, 1987;Klamler, 2005bKlamler, , 2005a) under a variety of names; a fairly comprehensive list of distance-rationalizability results is provided by Meskanen and Nurmi (2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type

2011

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The main idea of the distance rationalizability approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules can be distance rationalized. In this paper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability of several Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance rationalize Young's rule and Maximin rule using distances similar to the Hamming distance. We show that the claim that Young's rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance is incorrect; in fact, these consensus class and distance yield a new rule which has not been studied before. We prove that, similarly to Young's rule, this new rule has a computationally hard winner determination problem.

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The Copeland rule and Condorcet?s principle

Cited by 21 publications

References 17 publications

Consensus and the Act of Voting

Consensus and the Act of Voting

Distance rationalization of voting rules

Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type

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