The Costs and Benefits of Party Switching in Mexico

Abstract

Are party switchers successful at furthering their careers? Most research on party switching focuses on the decision to switch and with which party to affiliate. Less attention is paid to the costs and benefits of switching parties. Moreover, previous research examining the electoral success of party switchers has often ignored how costs vary between the candidate selection process and the general election. This study addresses this gap in the literature by using original data on the careers of Mexican federal deputies to examine the costs and benefits of switching parties at the candidate selection stage and during general elections. The results suggest that party switchers are more successful at winning ballot access than nonswitchers but are less likely to win office. These results help explain why ambitious politicians would switch parties, given the known risks of changing party affiliation.

Legislative Party Switching and the Changing Nature of the Canadian Party System, 1867–2015

“…The extent to which changes in the nature of parties and the party system in Canada are associated with differences in party affiliation decisions of incumbent legislators is an open question. Studies of party switching both in Canada (Snagovsky, 2015; Snagovsky and Kerby, forthcoming) and elsewhere (Desposato, 2006; Heller and Mershon, 2005; Kerevel, 2017; Mershon and Heller, 2003; Yoshinaka, 2016; Zielinski et al, 2005) focus on legislative party switching during a relatively short time period, which precludes an examination of how longer-term changes in party systems affect the incidence and electoral consequences of party switching.…”

Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico

“…One, it addresses a heated debate in Mexico regarding the party-switching ban, the clause that prevents legislators from switching parties when running for reelection. 2 Whereas parties claimed that the ban aimed to halt party-switching, a widespread phenomenon among Mexican politicians (Kerevel 2014;2017), Mexican civil society organizations argued that it would hinder the reform from having the desired effect in making legislators more responsive to voters. Results show that, despite the inclusion of the party-switching ban, designed to enhance the party-centric system, legislators with reelection incentives increase their focus on legislation that caters to their new principal, revealing a surging link between legislators and their bases.…”

Migração partidária e resultados de política: evidência para municípios brasileiros

“…Além disso, almeja contribuir a ainda pouco explorada análise de impacto que a migração tem sobre o político migrante, tal como empreendida por Kerevel (2017). Por fim, busca-se estimar a influência dessa migração sobre as transferências recebidas pelo município do político que muda durante a vigência do seu mandato.…”

“…Em termos gerais, as estimações apontam que os prefeitos migrantes são mais propensos a buscarem reeleição, em sintonia com a hipótese de Kerevel (2017) e com os resultados obtidos por Schmitt (1999) para os parlamentares brasileiros. Tal resultado também está de acordo com os dados coletados, que apontam que os migrantes se reapresentam na eleição seguinte em 77,92% dos casos, enquanto que os não migrantes se reapresentam em 74,03% das vezes, condicional ao prefeito estar em primeiro mandato e a amostra estar pareada.…”

“…Resultados similares foram encontrados para parlamentares brasileiros por Schmitt (1999), e com os trabalhos internacionais de Grose e Yoshinaka (2003) e Kerevel (2017). Na Tabela 7 são apresentadas regressões similares às que foram expostas na Tabela 5 e estimadas pelo modelo representado na equação (21) Nota: ***, ** e * denotam significância ao nível de 1%, 5% e 10%, respectivamente.…”