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Software usedWordPerfect 10 for Windows XP Professional Braude on Matthews I'm pleased to see an increasing amount of attention being paid to the topic of responsibility in cases of DID. But I question whether Matthews and others are taking matters in a helpful direction. I have a number of related concerns, some dealing with specifics of Matthews's present paper, and some with views presupposed here but argued for elsewhere.First, Matthews may have framed the issues in a misleading and rather unhelpful way.As he sees it, the debate over responsibility and DID is, at its core, a debate between the Multiple Persons and Single Person theses. But as Matthews presents them, both theses appear to be non-starters. It seems to me (as I argued in detail in Braude, 1995) that personhood is not one thing, and moreover that there is no context-independent or culture-independent conception of a person. In fact, in some cultures, the (to us) familiar one body/one person presumption is not the default presumption even for normal cases. And even in cultures where one body/one person is the default presumption, context plays a central role in determining whether we treat DID patients as one person or many. Granted, it's appropriate to assign DID patients only one drivers' license or social security number, but different criteria of individuation are required for other contexts-say, promise-keeping, gift-giving, or deciding whether one should have sex with a spouse's alter. Like the question, "How many things are in this room?", the question "Is S a single person or multiple persons?" has no answer at all apart from a context in which the question is relevant and certain criteria of individuation seem more apt than others. But in that case, neither the Multiple Persons nor the Single Person thesis is true generally or in the abstract.Matthews advocates the Single Person thesis. On his view, DID patients merely behave and appear as if they are more than one person. So no matter how dramatic the patient's dissociative state-for example, no matter how sharply and broadly characterized an alter might be, Matthews claims that "the patient is to be regarded morally and legally as a single human person" (p. __). Moreover, he apparently believes that considerations about personal identity always do (or at least should) undergird our judgments about moral or criminal responsibility, even if in practice we can get away with relying on a mistaken conception of personal identity, one that would be inadequate for a theory of identity, or which fails to provide sufficient