The Definition of a Surface Water Right and Transferability

Johnson, Ronald N.; Gisser, Micha; Werner, Michael Jürgen

doi:10.1086/466984

Cited by 104 publications

(43 citation statements)

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“…While international river basin management involves social, political, economic, hydrological and ecological dimensions, this study concentrates on those factors that influence the decision to negotiate and sign a treaty regarding the management of the water. There is a sizable body of literature on water rights [e.g., see Ditwiler, 1975;Johnson et al, 1981;Ostrom, 1962;Burness and Quirk, 1980;Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1992;Dudley, 1992] as well as on apportionment and river basin management [see Dinar and Loehman, 1995;Wescoat, 1995;Becker and Easter, 1998;Just and Netanyahu, 1998;Krutilla and Eckstein, 1970;Boisson de Chazournes, 1998;Hirji and Grey, 1998;Dellapenna, 1994;Wolf, 2000], yet no prior quantitative studies of international water treaty formation have been conducted.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International bilateral water treaty formation

Espey

Towfique

2004

Water Resources Research

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[1] A logistic model is estimated to determine factors that have influenced the formation of bilateral international water treaties over the last 60 years. Results indicate that the larger a water basin is as a percent of a country's size, the more likely the country is to form a treaty regarding its management. On the other hand, the more control over the water basin any given country has, the less likely it will be involved in a treaty. The results also support aspects of two competing theories about the role of country differences, that in some cases they serve as obstacles to treaty formation yet in other cases they encourage treaty formation to formalize management when informal arrangements are not adequate.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International bilateral water treaty formation

Espey

Towfique

2004

Water Resources Research

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“…The return flow of a diversion returns back to the river before the next diversion point (see Table 1). This is a common scenario setting in the literature (see e.g., [13,24,25]). The simplified river system facilitates the analysis but is not necessary, however [26].…”

Section: Locational Water Rights Economic Efficiency and Third-partmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The changes in return flows might also result in insufficient water for diversion to downstream users. To internalize the externalities that affect other water users, most studies propose that the water rights should be defined on the basis of consumptive use (see e.g., [13][14][15]). When flow constraints are not binding, this type of water rights implements the optimal solution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When flow constraints are not binding, this type of water rights implements the optimal solution. When flow constraints are binding, however, a two-party upstream transfer can result in impairment even when consumptive use is the measure of water right [13,16]. Moreover, consumptive use transfers may not prevent damage to instream flows [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Water Trading: Locational Water Rights, Economic Efficiency, and Third-Party Effect

Hung

Shaw

Chie

2014

Water

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Rivers flow downstream and unidirectionally. However, this fact has not yet been utilized in the institutional design for water trading. By utilizing this characteristic, we first designed a water trading system of "locational water rights." This new system is able to mitigate the return flow-related and instream flow-related third-party effects of volumetric reliability from water transfers. We provided mathematical proof of its economic efficiency. We then applied this water trading system to the case of the Choushui River basin in Taiwan. In this area, agriculture is highly developed while domestic and industrial water demands have increased rapidly. Using an agent-based model simulation, we estimated the potential economic benefits of implementing the system of locational water rights in the Choushui River basin.

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“…This sharing, known as the reparto or repartimiento (Rodríguez 2006; Rivera 1998) keeps water not only in the same basin, but the same ditch. The NM Office of the State Engineer (OSE) has the power to decide whether an out-of-basin water transfer is acceptable, but they are possible (Nunn et al 1991;Johnson et al 1981).…”

Section: Background On Acequiasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Estimating Willingness to Pay to Protect Acequia Irrigation and Culture: Lessons from San Miguel County, NM

Raheem¹

2014

Proceedings - Irrigation, Society and Landscape. Tribute to Thomas F. Glick

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Abstract. Traditional gravity fed irrigation systems in Hispano communities in New Mexico, USA, are referred to as acequias. Water scarcity is currently motivating negotiations between acequias and municipalities over sharing agreements. Research on willingness to pay to protect and maintain acequias is still scarce. These valuation data could be helpful to improve the quality of water resources decision making and therefore rural development strategies in this region, which is relatively poor compared to the US average.Data from an open-ended CVM survey are used to examine WTP for a program designed to strengthen and perpetuate irrigation and culture on the acequias of El Río de las Gallinas, in rural northeastern New Mexico. Results indicate that the community supports the program in general, with higher levels of support among rural residents and Anglos.

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The Definition of a Surface Water Right and Transferability

Cited by 104 publications

References 0 publications

International bilateral water treaty formation

International bilateral water treaty formation

Water Trading: Locational Water Rights, Economic Efficiency, and Third-Party Effect

Estimating Willingness to Pay to Protect Acequia Irrigation and Culture: Lessons from San Miguel County, NM

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