The differential demand for indirect rule: evidence from the North Caucasus

Siroky, David S.; Dzutsev, Valeriy; Hechter, Michael

doi:10.1080/1060586x.2013.788877

Cited by 15 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Most important, we predict the greatest amount of separatist activity from groups that were recently deprived of autonomy-those groups that experienced a shift from indirect rule to direct rule (Hechter, 2013;Siroky & Aprasdize, 2011;Siroky, Dzutsev, & Hechter, 2013). Retracted or lost autonomy provides a strong motive and need not significantly diminish the group's collective action capacity.…”

Section: A Theory Of Lost Autonomymentioning

confidence: 89%

“…The capacity for separatism is largely irrelevant, however, if autonomous groups lack the desire for secession, either because the status quo satisfies their demand for selfdetermination or the potential risks associated with rebellion are excessively great. Most important, we predict the greatest amount of separatist activity from groups that were recently deprived of autonomy-those groups that experienced a shift from indirect rule to direct rule (Hechter, 2013;Siroky and Aprasdize, 2011;Siroky, Dzutsev, & Hechter, 2013). Retracted or lost autonomy provides a strong motive and need not significantly diminish the group's collective action capacity.…”

Section: A Theory Of Lost Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism

Siroky

Cuffe

2014

Comparative Political Studies

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Case studies suggest that ethnic groups with autonomous institutional arrangements are more prone to secede, but other evidence indicates that autonomy reduces the likelihood of secession. To address this debate, we disaggregate their autonomy status into three categoriescurrently autonomous, never autonomous, and lost autonomy-and then unpack how each shapes the logic of collective action. We argue groups that were never autonomous are unlikely to mobilize due to a lack of collective action capacity, whereas currently autonomous groups may have the capacity but often lack the motivation. Most important, groups that have lost autonomy often possess both strong incentives and the capacity to pursue secession, which facilitates collective action. Moreover, autonomy retraction weakens the government's ability to make future credible commitments to redress grievances. We test these conjectures with data on the autonomous status and separatist behavior of 324 groups in more than 100 countries from 1960 to 2000. Our analysis shows clear empirical results regarding the relationship between autonomy status and separatism. Most notably, we find that formerly autonomous groups are the most likely to secede, and that both currently autonomous and never autonomous groups are much less likely. Keywords nationalism, separatism, decentralization, autonomy Does autonomy satisfy the demand for more self-determination, or instead foster the capacity and whet the appetite for independence? Is political 2 Comparative Political Studies XX(X) decentralization a viable solution for multiethnic states, or a slippery slope? Some scholars and policymakers see autonomy as the main mechanism to resolve tensions and redistributive issues between the central government and spatially concentrated, culturally distinct groups (Bermeo, 2002;Bermeo & Amoretti, 2003;L. Diamond, 1999;Stepan, 1999). Others studies, however, show that autonomy can actually exacerbate relations between the state and ethnic groups, for it cultivates the capacity for collective action and self-rule without significantly reducing desire for more of it (Brancati, 2009;Bunce, 1999;Coppieters, 2001;Cornell, 2002;Roeder, 1991).This article posits that the theoretical and empirical disagreement over the effect of autonomy is partly due to conflating two distinct situations in the implicit reference category-groups that are not autonomous. This binary classification compares groups that are currently autonomous to a baseline that is comprised of both groups that have never been autonomous, and those that once had autonomy, but lost it. Groups that have never been autonomous and those that have lost autonomy are distinct in their motivation and their capacity for collective action. Whereas never autonomous groups may be unlikely to mobilize due to a lack of collective action capacity, currently autonomous groups may have such capacity, but should find the cost of attempting to alter the status quo too high compared with the benefits they currently enjoy from being auton...

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Section: A Theory Of Lost Autonomymentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: A Theory Of Lost Autonomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism

Siroky

Cuffe

2014

Comparative Political Studies

Self Cite

120

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…According to Stalin (1920), Bolshevik rule could be made 'near and dear' to minorities by staffing state organs in border regions with 'local people acquainted with the manner of life, habits, customs, and language of the native population'. Russia's policies towards the peoples of the North Caucasus are still planned along these lines (Siroky et al 2013;Hall 2015). However, local mediators can also turn against the centre, so some alien rulers prefer to enforce direct control over their borderlands.…”

Section: Alien Rule and Its Discontentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accepting Alien Rule? State-Building Nationalism in Georgia’s Azeri Borderland

Berglund¹

2019

Europe-Asia Studies

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How did ethnic Azeris in the Marneuli, Bolnisi and Dmanisi districts, located inside Georgia but bordering Azerbaijan, react to the reorganisation of political space along national lines after the Soviet Union's dissolution? 'Beached' in foreign states bent on nationalising their domains, minorities throughout Eurasia sometimes rejected and sometimes accepted their alien rulers. This essay examines reactions to this predicament among Georgia's Azeris. Drawing on elite interviews and data from a matched-guise experiment, it concludes that locals have come to accept their host state after its state-building nationalism took an inclusive turn and the distinction between aliens and natives faded.EVEN BEFORE GEORGIA DECLARED ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic Azeris in Marneuli, Bolnisi and Dmanisi had begun to feel-and resent-its rule. Residents in these districts, situated across the border from Azerbaijan, had in recent months seen their villages rechristened with Georgian-sounding place names. Jafarli turned into Samtredo, Fakhrali became Talaveri, and so on, in what locals perceived as an attempt to sever their bond to their birthplace (MRMG 2011a). Stranded inside a foreign state and under the thumb of alien rule, local Azeris had to contemplate their response.Minorities across Eurasia faced a similar dilemma. As the USSR broke up, 'titular' nationalities proclaimed independence in the Soviet socialist republics bearing their names and then embarked on 'nationalising' policies (Brubaker 1996;, p. 1786). Ethnic differences had been institutionalised under Soviet rule, since titulars benefited from affirmative action policies at the expense of others in their republic (Slezkine 1994;Beissinger 2002; Broers 2004, p. 116). After the sudden border demarcations that occurred

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“…Only after persistent and multiple setbacks did Islam became the preferred “systemic response” of a multiethnic region (Hassner 2009). Recent surveys from the region indicate that many respondents, especially the middle class, want more autonomy in their political affairs even now (Siroky, Dzutsev, and Hechter 2013). Apart from historical reasons, external sponsorship may have contributed to shaping local preferences for Islam.…”

Section: The Emergence Of Islam and Its Relation To The Statementioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Support for Sharia: Evidence from the Russian North Caucasus

Dzutsati

Siroky

Dzutsev

2016

Politics and Religion

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Many scholars have argued that orthodox Muslims harbor attitudes that are more economically communitarian and politically illiberal, since individuals are seen as embedded within a larger community that places a premium on social order. Yet most studies have ignored the potential of Islam as an ideological platform for political reformers. Religion in general and Islam in particular has mostly been treated as a predictor rather than a derivative of political-economic preferences. This article suggests that, in the absence of credible secular political ideologies and representative political mechanisms, reformist-minded individuals are likely to use religion as a political platform for change. When Muslims are a minority in a repressive non-Muslim society, Islamic orthodoxy can serve as a political platform for politically and economically liberal forces. We test these conjectures with original micro-level data from the Russian North Caucasus and find strong support for them.

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The differential demand for indirect rule: evidence from the North Caucasus

Cited by 15 publications

References 32 publications

Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism

Lost Autonomy, Nationalism and Separatism

Accepting Alien Rule? State-Building Nationalism in Georgia’s Azeri Borderland

The Political Economy of Support for Sharia: Evidence from the Russian North Caucasus

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