In liberal democracies, the approval ratings of political leaders have been shown to track citizens' perceptions of the state of the economy. By contrast, in illiberal democracies and competitive autocracies, leaders are often thought to boost their popularity by exploiting nationalism, exaggerating external threats, and manipulating the media. Using time-series data, I examine the determinants of presidential approval in Russia since 1991, a period in which leaders' ratings swung between extremes. I find that Yeltsin's and Putin's ratings were, in fact, closely linked to public perceptions of economic performance, which, in turn, reflected objective economic indicators. Although media manipulation, wars, terrorist attacks, and other events also mattered, Putin's unprecedented popularity and the decline in Yeltsin's are well explained by the contrasting economic circumstances over which each presided. I n liberal democracies, the approval ratings of political leaders play an important role in the interaction between citizens and their governments. 1 Like elections-but far more frequently-they communicate to officials what the public thinks of their performance. Moreover, the messages such polls send have been shown to make sense. In various Western democracies, leaders' ratings tend to rise and fall with the country's economic performance. Respondents appear to hold their leaders responsible and reward them for effective economic management with approval, much as, when voting retrospectively, they repay competent and honest incumbents with reelection.But what role do such ratings play in illiberal democracies and competitive autocracies, where formally democratic institutions coexist with authoritarian elements? In such states, public opinion is often viewed as more a product of political manipulation than an input into politics. Even when the polls themselves are trustworthy, they are thought likely to capture the effects of rulers' political theater rather than reasoned evaluations rooted in material reality. Citizens, fed distorted information by an unfree press and cynical about the possibilities for participation, are expected to focus on image and personalities rather Daniel Treisman is Professor of