The Effect of Public Policy on Strike Activity in the Public Sector

Partridge, Dane M.

doi:10.2190/f3jp-34g6-bv3h-7kdg

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Feuille (1979) notes, for example, that while compulsory interest arbitration may reduce the probability of strikes, it does not “protect against wildcats or against work stoppages over issues outside the scope of bargaining.” Moreover, most studies have found that right‐to‐strike laws have no significant effect on strike incidence (Currie and McConnell 1991; Olson 1986; Partridge 1992). An exception was Partridge (1990), who found a limited right to strike was positively related to strike incidence. Second, interest arbitration has been successful in reducing strikes (Ichniowski 1982; Olson 1986; Currie and McConnell 1991).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third, strike penalties, when enforced, can deter strikes. Finally, laws that do not provide finality usually with mediation or fact‐finding as the final step were found to be insignificantly related to strike activity (Partridge 1990).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, most studies have found that right-to-strike laws have no significant effect on strike incidence (Currie and McConnell 1991;Olson 1986;Partridge 1992). An exception was Partridge (1990), who found a limited right to strike was positively related to strike incidence. Second, interest arbitration has been successful in reducing strikes (Ichniowski 1982;Olson 1986;Currie and McConnell 1991).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Do Public‐Sector Strike Bans Really Prevent Conflict?

Hebdon¹,

Stern²

2003

Industrial Relations

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This article examines the effectiveness of strike-ban laws in reducing industrial conflict at the municipal level of government. Our central findings are that job actions were higher in states that had no law or no finality in the law, publicity campaigns were used as a pressure tactic in the bargaining process, and grievance delays were greatest under final offer arbitration. Thus dispute costs are highest in jurisdictions that provide no finality in dispute resolution whether or not an explicit framework for bargaining exists.

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