The effect of repeated imagery on memory

Abstract

Imagery is a powerful psychotherapeutic technique, but one that is potentially risky as individuals can mistake an imagined experience for an autobiographical one. Two experiments examined whether repeatedly imagining the same scenario influences the likelihood of such errors. Repetition increased the similarity between phenomenological ratings of imagery and autobiographical memory: After three repetitions, imagery ratings were equal to those for memories. However, repetition also increased recognition and source accuracy for both autobiographical memories and imagery, indicating that repetition may have contrasting effects when one is using heuristic versus systematic source monitoring processes. These results suggest that psychotherapists should not repeat imagery scenarios for legally-relevant issues, unless systematic source judgment processes can be assured, to protect clients from potential memory errors associated with therapeutic imagery.

Judgement of confidence in childhood memories

“…However, imagined and vicariously experienced events can also be associated with vivid sensory and affective phenomenology under some conditions (e.g. Arbuthnott, 2005;Lampinen et al, 2005;Sheen, Kemp, & Rubin, 2001), so 'Probably because it's more recent than say age 5 or 6' Type of event 2 'I'm confident because nothing like that has happened before or after' judgement based on these factors may be less accurate than judgements based on factors such as autobiographical consistency and external verification. Five participants expressed confidence in their recollections due to the speed and fluency of memory retrieval, assuming that anything that came to mind quickly must represent retrieval rather than construction or creation.…”

“…Such certainty about the source of strongly experienced recollections may be a functional adaptation because situations that most benefit from prior learning, such as occasions of danger or great benefit, would likely be associated with strong emotions and sensory experiences. However, such beliefs are also potentially risky for source attribution, because manipulations such as conversational encoding (Kealy & Arbuthnott, 2003) or repeatedly imagining the same scene (Arbuthnott, 2005;Lampinen et al, 2005) can increase the sensory and emotional phenomenology of imagined events. Furthermore, emotional and sensory stimulation is the explicit goal of many media events, so it is likely that memory of such media-induced experiences would also be associated with vivid phenomenology.…”

Imagination and false memory inductions: investigating the role of process, content and source of imaginations

“…Arbuthnott and her colleagues demonstrate that the source of imagery scripts seems to have consequences on the phenomenological characteristics of memories involving imagery experiences (Arbuthnott, 2005;Arbuthnott et al, 200X;Arbuthnott, Geelen, & Kealy, 2002;Kealy & Arbuthnott, 2003). Compared to memories for actual events, memories for imagery experiences based on others' scripts (Arbuthnott et al, 2002) are rated as lower in their sensory detail.…”

Imagery encoding and false recognition errors: Examining the role of imagery process and imagery content on source misattributions

“…Interestingly, when participants generate images of themselves interacting with objects presented in thematic lists, false memory rates in the DRM task are reduced relative to a control condition involving reading (Gunter, Bodner, & Azad, 2007) but the relative false memory rate (approximately 51%, Gunter et al, 2007, Experiment 3) is considerably higher than that observed when participants describe the details guiding their own imagery generations (Experiments 1Á2; approximately 20%, Foley et al, 2006, Experiment 2). Particularly in applied contexts, the individual (witness or client) is at least partially responsible for creating the materials to guide imagery generations (Arbuthnott, 2005;Arbuthnott, Arbuthnott, & Thompson, 2006;Foley et al, 2009). Thus further study of the potential facilitative effects of self-specified imagery would address more fully apparent inconsistencies regarding the effects of imagery encoding on memory accuracy, and would better inform debates about the use of imagery in applied settings.…”