The Effects of Performance Information on Public Resource Allocations: A Study of Chile's Performance-Based Budgeting System

The Use of Performance Information in Budgetary Decision‐making by Legislators: Is Estonia Any Different?

“…There are a number of empirical studies that explore the effects of PI on legislative decision‐making in general (for overviews of the literature, see, e.g., Jordan and Hackbart 1999; Frank and D’Souza 2004), and several studies that have looked at the utilization of PI in budgetary decision‐making in the executive branch (for recent overviews of studies, see, e.g., Jordan and Hackbart 1999; Melkers and Willoughby 2005; Gomez and Willoughby 2008; Zaltsman 2009; Ho 2011). However, there is very little research exploring empirically the question of whether and how legislators employ PI in budgetary decision‐making; among the studies that have been undertaken, the focus has been either on the local government level (Melkers and Willoughby 2001; Wang 2008) or state level (Willoughby and Melkers 2000, 2001; Bourdeaux 2008), rather than on national governments.…”

“…However, there is very little research exploring empirically the question of whether and how legislators employ PI in budgetary decision‐making; among the studies that have been undertaken, the focus has been either on the local government level (Melkers and Willoughby 2001; Wang 2008) or state level (Willoughby and Melkers 2000, 2001; Bourdeaux 2008), rather than on national governments. It is important to keep in mind that even though PI may be used by the executive branch, this does not automatically carry over to legislative arenas (Melkers and Willoughby 2001; Zaltsman 2009). Below, an overview is given of those studies that have focused on the effects of PI on budgetary decision‐making in the legislature .…”

Can Centralized Performance Budgeting Systems Be Useful For Line Ministries? Evidence From Chile

“…Two other studies based on data from that same period also praised Chile's system, but presented a more measured representation of success. The first is an academic study that found that DIPRES performance indicators were not likely to affect budgetary decisions, that PMG indicators received constant attention within line ministries, and that ex‐post evaluations were often considered during budget negotiations and budget execution (Zaltsman ). The other one is a study by the World Bank, which evidenced that about half of ex‐post evaluations inform decision‐making processes, while the other half fail to meet quality standards (Rojas et al ).…”

“…For that version of the PMG, DIPRES allowed a group of third‐party experts to set and rate line ministries based on managerial standards. Previous studies and multiple interviewees explained that the previous version of the PMG consistently informed budget formulation and negotiations, and that it received constant attention within line ministries (Blöndal and Curristine ; Guzmán ; Zaltsman ). The current version of the PMG does not involve third‐party experts and is based on the performance indicator system from DIPRES, and the evidence shows that it has lost relevance.…”

Performance Budgeting and Accrual Budgeting

“…3 The intended objectives of performance and accrual budgeting reforms are to improve accountability and the effectiveness of public programs. Performance budgeting reforms aim to enhance the quality of public spending (Zaltsman, 2009) and to introduce some rationality into a hitherto subjective and political decisionmaking process (Willoughby, 2011).…”