The ideological component of Senate voting: Different principles or different principals?

Legislator voting and shirking: A critical review of the literature

“…For example, not only does shirking affect a politician's support in primary and general elections differently (Wright, 1993), but evidence of shirking from the two stage residual approach disappears when measures of these broader constituency groups through either campaign donations (Fort, Hallagan, Morong and Stegner, 1993) or a congressman's president (Langbein, 1993) are controlled for.…”

Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence

“…53 Studies that are particular focused on this point are, among others, Bender (1994), Fort et al (1993), Goff andGrier (1993), Jung et al (1994), Krehbiel (1993), Peltzman (1984), Richardson and Munger (1990) and Stratmann (1994). influencing public policy and is likely to underestimate the influence of special interest groups. 54 As argued, the pattern of constituents' preference representation is important for the relative influence of interest groups on the political process.…”

“…Some authors distinguish special interest groups from the reelection constituency, others incorporate these groups into a legislator's constituency. For example, Kau and Rubin (1993) view voting in response to contributions from special moneyed interests as shirking at the constituents' expense, whereas Fort et al (1993) take PACs as part of a legislator's constituency. 55 Legislator's pursuit of own goals other than ideology are only rarely considered.…”

“…9 Studies belonging to the first group are, among others, Chappell (198 l a), Coughlin (1985), Durden et al (1991), Fort et al (1993), Frendreis and Waterman (1985), Kau et al (1982), Rubin (1981, 1993), McArthur and Marks (1988), Masters and Zardkoohi (1988), Peltzman (1984), Saltzman (1987), Silberman and Durden (1976), Stratmann (1991Stratmann ( , 1992bStratmann ( ,1995a, and Wilhite and Theilmann (1987). Studies that find support for only moderate influence include Abler (1991), Bronars and Lott (1994), Chappell (1982), Grenzke (1989a), Langbein (1993), Wayman (1985), Welch (1982), Wilhite (1988) and Wright (1985). judged to belong to the set of most influential PACs, were not able to change the voting outcome on any specific bill.…”

Environmental Constituent Interest, Green Electricity Policies, and Legislative Voting

“…Also, I obtained a measure of ideology from Poole and Rosenthal [35]. 6 This value is based on an extensive computer model of historical voting; lower values represent a more liberal member and higher values a more conservative member. In my sample, the lowest value is À0.922 (Rep. McDermott, D-WA), while the highest value is 1.364 (Rep. Paul, R-TX).…”