The Independence Paradox: (im)possibilities facing non‐executive directors in The Netherlands

Hooghiemstra, Reginald; Manen, van Jaap

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00372.x

Cited by 59 publications

(62 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…In the case of outside directors,the negative effect on both ROA and ROE even though statistically insignificant is consistent with Hooghiemstra and van Manen, (2004) but inconsistent with the agency theory's prescription which predicted positive effect on CFP with board composition of majority outside directors. As part of their findings Hooghiemstra and van Manen, (2004) suggested that stakeholders are generally not satisfied with the supervisory role of outside directors.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 71%

“…As part of their findings Hooghiemstra and van Manen, (2004) suggested that stakeholders are generally not satisfied with the supervisory role of outside directors. Similar studies showing negative effect of outside directors on the accounting variables concluded that high proportions of outside directors result in excessive monitoring which stifle innovation and creativity on the part of inside directors.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Firstly, (Haniffa et al 2006;Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, 2004;Bhagat & Black, 2000;MacAvoy et al 1983;Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991;and Klein, 1998) all revealed negative relationship between outside directors and accounting performance indicators whilst (Zubaidah, 2009;Shleifer & Vishny, 1997;Dehaene et al, 2001) found positive effect between majority outside director and CFP. In the case of the negative effect, Hooghiemstra & Van Manen, (2004) noted that stakeholders are generally not satisfied with the supervisory role of outside directors. Correspondingly, www.ccsenet.org/ijbm International Journal of Business and Management Vol.…”

Section: Board Composition and Financial Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effect of Board Composition on Corporate Financial Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in Ghana

Puni¹,

Osei²,

Ofei³

2014

IJBM

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This study adds to the literature on corporate governance and corporate financial performance by assessing the effect of board composition on the financial performance of listed firms in Ghana. Using a static panel regression model, the results show that contrary to the agency theory, inside directors tend to have a positive and significant effect on corporate financial performance whilst outside directors have a negative but statistically insignificant effect on corporate financial performance of the listed firms in Ghana. In addition, it was found that the existence of nomination committees tend to have a negative effect on corporate financial performance of listed firms in Ghana. The study recommends that listed firms in Ghana should look at how to continuously empower inside directors to be able to perform their work well instead of bringing in more outside directors to check them. Moreover, the nomination process of board members must be made transparent to achieve the objective of recruiting competent and ethical minded executives to the board. Guidelines for executive recruitment to the board must be established and if possible the nomination committee must employ the services of executive-hunting agency which would assist the committee in the recruitment process.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 71%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Board Composition and Financial Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effect of Board Composition on Corporate Financial Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in Ghana

Puni¹,

Osei²,

Ofei³

2014

IJBM

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“…Schoorman et al, 2007;Nienaber et al, 2015), but in carrying out their duties, Chairpersons (and the whole Board) are largely dependent on the information provided by the CEO (e.g. Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 2004;Bailey and Peck, 2013;Koskinen and Lämsä, 2016). This dependence can be assumed to increase vulnerability from the Chair's point of view and can therefore be significant from the perspective of trust.…”

Section: Trust In the Ceo-chair And The Ceo-board Relationshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Development of trust in the CEO-chair relationship

Koskinen

Lämsä

2017

BJM

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Final Draft 1 Development of trust in the CEO-Chair relationship AbstractPurpose: This study explores trust development in the dyadic relationship of CEO and Chair of the Board. Approach:A narrative approach is adopted to examine the meanings that CEOs and Chairpersons give to trust in their relationship, and to explore trust as an evolving phenomenon that can increase or decline over the course of the relationship. The data include 16 CEO-Chair dyads from Finnish limited companies. Findings:The results suggest that trust may exist on different levels and evolve in various ways during the course of the relationship. Integrity and agreement on company strategy are proposed to form the foundation for trust in the CEO-Chair relationship, whereas ability and benevolence are necessary for trust to develop to a higher level. Research limitations:Studying trust development based on data generated at one point of time and in only one country are the major limitations of the study.Practical implications: It is proposed that the level of trust influences value creation in the relationship. Originality/value:The study adds to the limited number of previous studies on the CEOChair relationship and contributes to the literature on trust development by making visible the viewpoint of both partners, and the meaning of the different components of trust.

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“…the ability to monitor objectively. By contrast, firm-specific expertise, in the sense of a deeper business understanding, may increase real independence (Hooghiemstra and van Manen 2004;Wagner 2008). …”

Section: Board Independence and Firm-specific Expertise: The Tradmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial Disclosure and the Board: A Case for Non-Independent Directors

2010

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-In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources.

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The Independence Paradox: (im)possibilities facing non‐executive directors in The Netherlands

Cited by 59 publications

References 19 publications

The Effect of Board Composition on Corporate Financial Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in Ghana

The Effect of Board Composition on Corporate Financial Performance: Evidence from Listed Firms in Ghana

Development of trust in the CEO-chair relationship

Financial Disclosure and the Board: A Case for Non-Independent Directors

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