The institutionalization of meritocracy in Latin American regulatory agencies

Abstract

Research into 72 regulatory authorities in four policy sectors (pharmacy, telecommunications, finances and pensions) in 18 Latin American countries shows that the institutionalization of meritocratic practices in the recruitment and careers of its staff has not been widespread, even in countries with a professionalized bureaucracy. The implementation of meritocracy could be partially explained through the policy sector and the influence of epistemic communities while alternative explanations like administrative legacies or the autonomy of the regulatory authorities to devise and implement personnel policies play a less important role. The institutionalization of meritocracy in ‘islands of excellence’ has policy implications for sustained merit-based strategies for the civil service. Points for practitioners This research has shown that the institutionalization of meritocracy is not widespread when considering recruitment and staff careers in 72 regulatory Latin American agencies. Successful meritocratic practices are partially explained by the policy sector in which these agencies operate. Economic regulated sectors (financial services, delivery of pensions and telecommunications) are more meritocratic than social regulated areas (pharmacy). Two explanations have been offered for this. On the one hand, meritocracy seems to be influenced by particular epistemic communities in which competition plays an important role (for instance, economists). On the other hand, agencies need to increase their credibility and attract the confidence of international donors and private regulated enterprises. These findings suggest that the introduction of meritocracy could be more successfully approached through a more individualized process (i.e. by targeting individual agencies) instead of launching overall civil service reforms with uncertain consequences.

The Politics–Bureaucracy Interface in Developing Countries

“…This is a key factor in the high levels of bureaucratic autonomy and influence in policymaking. In contrast, many states, particularly in Latin America, have tended not to have formal civil service entrance exams (Grindle ; Parrado and Salvador ). Instead, most positions in the bureaucracy are “assigned on the basis of political affiliation, social class, ethnic group, nepotism, or family connections” (Meacham : 282).…”

Agencies in Three South Eastern European Countries: Politics, Expertise and Law

“…It is also related to the problem of specialisation and expertise. Th e resulting politicisation of agencies prevents the institutionalisation of meritocracy (see also Parrado and Salvador 2011). Th eir management has to be fl exible with regard to various unlawful infl uences (with regard to personnel, for example, employing relatives of important persons) in order to win political and public support, to be able to protect minimal independence in their subject matter, and to stick to the European standards.…”

El desarrollo del Estado regulador en América Latina

“…Estas mostraron algunas cualidades distintivas: una independencia política débil, pero con una fuerte identidad profesional, concentrando experiencia técnica y recursos organizativos para hacer más fuerte la intervención pública en el sector específico bajo supervisión (Jordana/Ramió 2010). Aunque no en todos los casos, las agencias también proporcionan una mayor estabilidad para los funcionarios que trabajan en ellas, una característica especialmente importante, dadas las deficiencias de la administración pública en América Latina (Parrado/Salvador 2010). De hecho, su legitimidad intenta fundamentarse en la capacidad profesional y en la creación de condiciones de estabilidad para las operaciones de mercado e inversiones a largo plazo.…”