The Interplay of Incumbency, Political Dynasty and Corruption in Indonesia: Are Political Dynasties the Cause of Corruption in Indonesia?

Purwaningsih, Titin; Widodo, Bambang Eka Cahya

doi:10.31439/unisci-89

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…The most important thing in efforts to prevent corruption that must be done is to strengthen government control. Five things can be done to prevent corrupt practices in the regions, including supervision in political recruitment, one of which is the Pilkades, bureaucratic neutrality, transparency and accountability in budgeting, as well as oversight of regional policies to avoid pork tong policies [16]. It is homework for the government to design a kind of Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) at the village level that can prevent negative Pilkades practices.…”

Section: B Conflict Of Interest In Village Head Direct Electionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct Election of Village Head as a Trigger of Corruption Behavior

Alam¹,

Muluk²,

Wijaya³

2021

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual International Conference on Public and Business Administration (AICoBPA 2020)

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Direct election of village head in Indonesia is a simple form of democracy intended for village people. Many political dynamics occurred before and after the election of the village head. The practice of patron-client that colours the political process that occurs makes the tug of war between the competing camps in contestation increasingly stringent. Kinship seems to be a substantial capital to gain power. Direct election of village head that has a purpose of finding candidates for leaders who are superior and able to advance the village as if not a top priority. This paper seeks to describe how the democratic process in direct village head elections in Indonesia encourages the emergence of corrupt behavior by the village head. This paper will also present various findings that show that elected leaders tend to only pay attention to the interests of the supporters (clients) rather than the interests of village communities in general. It indicates as if the structural change in the regulation governing village governance did not have a significant impact on cultural issues in the village. Data were collected by interview, observation, and documentation as a field study. However, community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. It indicates as if the structural change in the regulation governing village governance did not have a significant impact on cultural issues in the village. Data were collected by interview, observation, and documentation as a field study. However, community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. It indicates as if the structural change in the regulation governing village governance did not have a significant impact on cultural issues in the village. Data were collected by interview, observation, and documentation as a field study. However, community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the ease of social assistance from the village government. In immaterial supporters want easy access to village administration. community support groups will in time demand that their elected leaders provide an outpouring of benefits both materially and immaterially. Physically the supporters want the e...

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Section: B Conflict Of Interest In Village Head Direct Electionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct Election of Village Head as a Trigger of Corruption Behavior

Alam¹,

Muluk²,

Wijaya³

2021

Proceedings of the 3rd Annual International Conference on Public and Business Administration (AICoBPA 2020)

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“…Estas dinastías suelen ser consideradas como fenómenos que destruyen la democracia y un factor causal de la corrupción, sin embargo, los resultados de este estudio son contrarios: solo un pequeño número (9%) de los casos de corrupción involucran familias de dinastías políticas (Purwaningsih y Widodo, 2020) En el caso de los titulares, el camino que recorren es bastante normal: el establecimiento de sus familias políticas como precursoras de una dinastía política en Indonesia.…”

Section: La Transparenciaunclassified

Corrupción en las contrataciones públicas: investigaciones recientes y tendencias de investigación

2022

Ciencia Latina

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El presente es un artículo de revisión aborda el problema público de la corrupción, es decir, aquel que afecta a las entidades públicas. Se realizó la revisión artículos científicos realizados en distintos países, en las diferentes dimensiones que encierra este problema multidimensional. El propósito es el acercamiento y la inmersión a la producción científica realizada en los cinco últimos años para conocer cuáles son los estudios recientes y las tendencias en la investigación de la corrupción en las contrataciones públicas. Se presenta la revisión bibliográfica sistemática de artículos extraídos de diferentes revistas indexadas a bases de datos de prestigio, cuyas publicaciones son comprendidas entre el año 2017 y el año 2021. Los resultados del estudio muestran que se trata de un problema estudiado desde diferentes perspectivas, con algunos resultados contradictorios e insuficientes para explicar y entender este fenómeno político, sociocultural de alta complejidad; pero nos ha permitido concluir en la necesidad de seguir estudiándolo para generar más teoría y dar explicación científica a aquellas causas en las que subyacen las maneras de actuar y de comportarse.

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“…The usual model is the use of close and direct relatives such as in Kediri (Bimantara & Harsasto, 2018) with a pattern of profiling and diaspora to legislative institutions such as in Banten (Sutisna, 2017), Bontang (Akbar & Purnomo, 2019), Nagan Raya (Syahbandir, Hasan, & Izwar, 2019) and strategic administrative positions in the Bureaucracy as happened in Riau (Darmansyah, Syahrani, & Harirah, 2020). So it is not surprising if the findings (Prianto, 2016) (Purwaningsih & Widodo, 2020) of Political dynasties that create oligarchies in political parties in practice hinder good governance practice in the regions. This article takes an analysis of a different angle.…”

Section: | Journal Of Local Government Issues (Logos) 4 (1) March 2021 Pp 45-59mentioning

confidence: 99%

Reexamining the Democratic Party in the Implementation of Indonesia’s General Elections

Habibie

Saputra

Nofrima

et al. 2021

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Direct elections (Pilkada) are part of democracy; it shows a clear orientation, where the positioning and interests of the people are at the highest level in politics so far. This study aims to analyze some of the main problems in the implementation of regional elections in Indonesia. This type of research used in this research is qualitative research. Analyzes were performed using the Nvivo 12 plus software. In data collection, this research was conducted through literature studies or focused on secondary data in journals and well-known online media news. The result of this research is that the direct regional election cannot be separated from various problems, such as the size of political capital, the weak role of political parties, the existence of interests, oligarchs, political dynasties, money politics, and intimidation of state civil servants (ASN). Pilkada immediately seemed to be dominated by elite groups with established modalities not to provide public space to participate

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The Interplay of Incumbency, Political Dynasty and Corruption in Indonesia: Are Political Dynasties the Cause of Corruption in Indonesia?

Cited by 11 publications

References 3 publications

Direct Election of Village Head as a Trigger of Corruption Behavior

Direct Election of Village Head as a Trigger of Corruption Behavior

Corrupción en las contrataciones públicas: investigaciones recientes y tendencias de investigación

Reexamining the Democratic Party in the Implementation of Indonesia’s General Elections

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