The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief–logic conflict

Howarth, Stephanie; Handley, Simon J.; Walsh, Clare R.

doi:10.3758/s13421-015-0555-x

Cited by 42 publications

(53 citation statements)

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“…Handley et al (2011) and Howarth, Handley, and Walsh (2016) demonstrated that the same interference occurred in a full between-participants comparison. Participants solved the task in a counterbalanced blocked manner, such that in one block only belief-based responses were required, and in the next block only logic-based responses – and vice versa.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 86%

“…Furthermore, a question arises with regard to how the model would capture responses under belief instructions. Do we assume that these decisions are based on two distributions of belief-strength, with a logic-based response criterion which shifts according to validity (i.e., a so-called logic-bias, Howarth et al, 2016)? For now, we argue it is safest to rely on the signal detection theory as an excellent measurement model until it is specified in a more dynamic way such that it can also make predictions about the time-course of processing (e.g., Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

2016

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Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel. Participants were given deductive reasoning problems of variable complexity and instructed to decide whether the conclusion was valid on half the trials or to decide whether the conclusion was believable on the other half. When belief and logic conflict, the default-interventionist view predicts that it should take less time to respond on the basis of belief than logic, and that the believability of a conclusion should interfere with judgments of validity, but not the reverse. The parallel-processing view predicts that beliefs should interfere with logic judgments only if the processing required to evaluate the logical structure exceeds that required to evaluate the knowledge necessary to make a belief-based judgment, and vice versa otherwise. Consistent with this latter view, for the simplest reasoning problems (modus ponens), judgments of belief resulted in lower accuracy than judgments of validity, and believability interfered more with judgments of validity than the converse. For problems of moderate complexity (modus tollens and single-model syllogisms), the interference was symmetrical, in that validity interfered with belief judgments to the same degree that believability interfered with validity judgments. For the most complex (three-term multiple-model syllogisms), conclusion believability interfered more with judgments of validity than vice versa, in spite of the significant interference from conclusion validity on judgments of belief.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.3758/s13421-016-0680-1) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 86%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

2016

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“…One possible interpretation of these findings is that the logical inference is available automatically and by default and intervention is required to successfully give a belief judgment. Howarth, Handley, and Walsh (2016) tested this account by examining the impact of a secondary task (Random Number Generation) on both belief-and logic-based judgments while completing both simple (Modus Ponens) and more complex (Disjunctions) reasoning problems. The results replicated earlier findings showing that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief and logic for both simple and complex arguments.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…However, the secondary task, while reducing accuracy of judgments overall, had its greatest impact on logic-based judgments. Howarth et al (2016) interpreted their findings as a conflict between two type-2 processes. They propose that logical responses are available at an early type-1 level, yet require type-2 processing in order to explicitly extract the underlying structure of an argument required for delivering a response based on the validity of the inference.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Notably, one of the key characteristics of this model is that the direction of interference between knowledge based and structural processing will depend upon the complexity of the logical argument, such that simple problems may cue type 1, logical responses early which will require inhibiting in order to produce a knowledge-based output. Howarth et al (2016) argued that both belief-and logic-based judgments depend upon type-1 and type-2 processes, where interference can occur bidirectionally at the type-2 stage or type-1 stage of processing which accounts for the evidence of intuitive detection of conflict and the impact of conflict under explicit instruction. This model has subsequently received support from evidence which shows that the direction of the impact of conflict on logic and belief judgments depends upon the complexity of the logical task (Trippas, Thompson & Handley, 2017).…”

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confidence: 99%

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The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Howarth

Handley

Walsh

2018

Thinking & Reasoning

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The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often generate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the logical inference. Recent research, however, shows that in some instances belief judgments take longer, are more prone to error and are more affected by cognitive load. One interpretation is that some logical inferences are available automatically and require intervention in order to respond according to beliefs. In two experiments, we investigate the effortful nature of belief judgments and the automaticity of logical inferences by increasing the inhibitory demands of the task. Participants were instructed to judge conclusion validity, believability and either font colour or font style, to increase the number of competing responses. Results showed that conflict more strongly affects judgments of believability than validity and when inhibitory demands are increased, the validity of an argument impacts more on belief judgments. These findings align with the new Parallel Processing model of belief bias.

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A test of two processes: The effect of training on deductive and inductive reasoning

et al. 2020

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Dual-process theories posit that separate kinds of intuitive (Type 1) and reflective (Type 2) processes contribute to reasoning. Under this view, inductive judgments are more heavily influenced by Type 1 processing, and deductive judgments are more strongly influenced by Type 2 processing. Alternatively, single-process theories propose that both types of judgments are based on a common form of assessment. The competing accounts were respectively instantiated as two-dimensional and one-dimensional signal detection models, and their predictions were tested against specifically targeted novel data using signed difference analysis. In two experiments, participants evaluated valid and invalid arguments, under induction or deduction instructions. Arguments varied in believability and type of conditional argument structure. Additionally, we used logic training to strengthen Type 2 processing in deduction (Experiments 1 & 2) and belief training to strengthen Type 1 processing in induction (Experiment 2). The logic training successfully improved validity-discrimination, and differential effects on induction and deduction judgments were evident in Experiment 2. While such effects are consistent with popular dual-process accounts, crucially, a one-dimensional model successfully accounted for the results. We also demonstrate that the one-dimensional model is psychologically interpretable, with the model parameters varying sensibly across conditions. We argue that single-process accounts have been prematurely discounted, and formal modeling approaches are important for theoretical progress in the reasoning field.

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The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful processing in the resolution of belief–logic conflict

Cited by 42 publications

References 48 publications

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

A test of two processes: The effect of training on deductive and inductive reasoning

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