The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?

Cole, Daniel H.; Grossman, Peter Z.

doi:10.2307/3146892

Cited by 138 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…The first task of economists is to give a definition of property rights or, more accurately, of the protection of property rights. As reported in Cole andGrossman (2002) "As A. Allan Schimd (1999, 233) maintains, '[p]roperty is a social fact or it is no fact at all'". The safeguard of property rights implies the existence of shared social norms recognizing individual property over and above common property, but this is not sufficient, however.…”

Section: Theories On Property Rightsmentioning

confidence: 88%

Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria

Asoni

2007

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political EquilibriaAndrea Asoni Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political EquilibriaAndrea Asoni * Department of Economics University of Chicago March 5, 2007Abstract This paper presents a survey of the literature on property rights and economic growth. It discusses different theoretical mechanisms that relate property rights to economic development. Lack of protection of property rights can result in slow economic growth through different channels: expropriation of private wealth, corruption of civil servants, excessive taxation and barriers to adoption of new technologies. The origins of property rights are also considered. Different theories are illustrated but more attention is paid to the "social conflict view" and its strengths and limitations. The second part of the paper illustrates relevant empirical works on property rights and growth.

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Section: Theories On Property Rightsmentioning

confidence: 88%

Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria

Asoni

2007

SSRN Journal

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“…The key to IAFs is to provide harvesters with long-term and secure rights (Hannesson 2004) that are legally enforceable, along with corresponding duties by nonowners to not interfere with these rights (Cole and Grossman 2002). In practice, individual harvesting rights are often specified as a revokable privilege, although New Zealand is a notable exception (National Research Council 1999).…”

Section: Rights and Responsibilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

Grafton

Árnason

Bjørndal

et al. 2006

Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci.

348

239

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Abstract:The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries. 710 Résumé : Les échecs des aménagements traditionnels centrés sur les espèces-cibles ont incité plusieurs chercheurs à proposer des approches halieutiques basées sur les écosystèmes pour favoriser les pêches durables. L'approche écosys-témique est nécessaire, en particulier, pour tenir compte des interactions pêche-écosystème; elle ne suffit pas, cependant, par elle-même pour régler deux facteurs importants qui contribuent à rendre les pêches non durables : les incitations insuffisantes pour les pêcheurs et la gestion inefficace souvent présente dans les pêches commerciales déve-loppées qui sont régies principalement par des limites à la récolte totale et par des contrôles d'entrée. Nous croyons qu'on doit mettre beaucoup plus l'accent sur la motivation des pêcheurs dans la gestion de la pêche. En utilisant des données provenant de plus d'une douzaine d'expériences naturelles de pêche commerciale, nous cherchons à démontrer que des approches fondées sur les incitations qui précisent mieux la communauté, les récoltes individuelles et les droits territoriaux et qui évaluent aussi financièrement les services de l'écosystème, couplées avec de la recherche gouvernementale, de la surveillance et de la gestion efficace, promeuvent les pêches commerciales durables.[Traduit par la Rédaction] Grafton et al.

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“…Such an exercise normally entails incurring transaction costs. The Coasian viewpoint is that property rights are essential for affirming the ultimate control over resources since transaction costs associated with the resources may often inhibit 'efficiency-enhancing' reallocations (Cole and Grossman, 2000). Environmental governance is also influenced by factors such as the nature and use of environmental resources, as well as the nature of arrangements in place to direct the use of such a resource (Paavola & Adger, 2002).…”

Section: New Institutional Economics At a Glancementioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Institutions, Equity, Efficiency and Effectiveness: The Case of Water Distribution in Lower Sundays River Valley, South Africa

Madigele¹

2017

ENRR

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Water supply disruptions are prevalent in various parts of South Africa. The Lower Sundays River Valley is not an exception. However, there is currently no physical shortage of water in the catchment. This study defines institutional arrangements and dynamics in the water sector in South Africa, using the Lower Sunday River Water Users Association as the case study. Key informant interviews reveal that relevant stakeholders are not adequately represented in management committees. Such institutional arrangement vacuums can lead to a failure of the water institutions in the catchment to provide water resources effectively.

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The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?

Cited by 138 publications

References 14 publications

Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria

Protection of Property Rights and Growth as Political Equilibria

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The Economics of Institutions, Equity, Efficiency and Effectiveness: The Case of Water Distribution in Lower Sundays River Valley, South Africa

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