Property rights are fundamental to economic analysis. There is, however, no consensus in the economic literature about what property rights are. Economists define them variously and inconsistently, sometimes in ways that deviate from the conventional understandings of legal scholars and judges. This article explores ways in which definitions of property rights in the economic literature diverge from conventional legal understandings, and how those divergences can create interdisciplinary confusion and bias economic analyses. Indeed, some economists' idiosyncratic definitions of property rights, if used to guide policy, could lead to suboptimal economic outcomes. (JEL K11, Q15)

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U.S. Energy Policy and the Pursuit of Failure is an analytic history of American energy policy. For the past forty years, the U.S. government has tried to develop comprehensive policies on energy, yet these efforts have failed repeatedly. These failures have not resulted from a lack of will or funds but rather from an inability to differentiate between what could be undertaken and what could actually be accomplished. This book explains how and why various policy efforts have come about, shows why politicians have been eager to back them, and analyzes why they have inevitably failed. Over the past four decades, U.S. energy policy makers have pursued not just policies that have failed but also a policy process that leads to failure.

The nominal efficiency of a regulatory regime is determined by comparing its social costs and benefits; the regime is nominally efficient if it produces benefits in excess of its costs. Thus, a regulatory regime can be at once nominally efficient and relatively inefficient. A regulatory regime that is nominally efficient in the early days of pollution-control efforts, when increments of environmental quality are relatively cheap, may (but will not necessarily) grow less efficient over time-producing less return on each dollar invested-as increments of environmental quality grow increasingly expensive. A regulatory regime that is more efficient in one institutional and technological setting may be less efficient (or inefficient) in another. In reality, however, this outcome will occur only under certain conditions; specifically, when the regulatory regime as a whole is more efficient. The discussion begins, for the sake of comparison, with a brief review of the "conventional" story of the Clean Air Act's regulatory regime. In addition, in 1987 the EPA wrapped up a small-scale and temporary but highly successful experiment in tradable rights to lead-content in gasoline. Like other institutions in society, those of environmental protection (including the regulatory regime itself) tend to evolve slowly, incrementally, and inconsistently. In large measure, the choice of regulatory regime depends on the goals and concerns of policy-makers.

Exogenous shocks may lead to policies that seem extreme and even “irrational”. This paper argues that, in the event of a major energy shock in the US that persists, such legislation is an inevitable response to the demand from constituents that political actors “do something”. Since shocks by their nature are unanticipated and are often highly technical and complex, boundedly rational legislators cannot generally understand all of the ramifications of the shock, much less hope to craft well-considered and precise legislation to deal with it. But the demand to “do something” means that a range of actions is politically necessary. The “shock” policy process is modelled as a stepwise legislative decision problem. If the crisis persists, legislation that promises a solution is likely to be the result, even if this “solution” is infeasible. The model is applied to five US energy shocks.