The media accountability of independent regulatory agencies

Abstract

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) are increasingly attracting academic and societal attention, as they represent the institutional cornerstone of the regulatory state and play a key role in policy-making. Besides the expected benefits in terms of credibility and efficiency, these regulators are said to bring about a 'democratic deficit', following their statutory separation from democratic institutions. Consequently, a 'multi-pronged system of control' is required. This article focuses on a specific component of this system, that is, the media. The goal is to determine whether media coverage of IRAs meets the necessary prerequisites to be considered a potential 'accountability forum' for regulators. The results of a comparison of two contrasted cases -the British and Swiss competition commissions -mostly support the expectations, because they show that media coverage of IRAs corresponds to that of the most relevant policy issues and follows the regulatory cycle. Furthermore, a systematic bias in media coverage can be excluded.

Has government been mediatized? A UK perspective

“…In the 'divided governance systems' typical of many modern democracies, government departments "steer complex networks of quasi-autonomous organisations" (Smith et al, 2011: 976) such as regulators, executive agencies and NGOs, all of which to a greater or lesser extent seek legitimacy through media attention (Magetti, 2012;Schillemans 2012;Carpenter and Krause, 2011). Esser identifies three distinctive "facets" of "political logic" operating within government which complicate responses to mediatization: the backstage area where policy is produced, the visible stage on which politicians seek power and publicity, and the institutional framework which limits what political actors can do (Esser 2013).…”

Accountability in an Independent Regulatory Setting: The Use of Impact Assessment in the Regulation of Financial Reporting in the UK

“…While our findings echo those by Fraas and Lutter (2011) who reported a tendency for mechanical application of IA for the purposes of regulatory compliance among independent regulators in the U.S (Fraas and Lutter 2011, p. 2), we offer important additional insights into the particular motivations behind IA in a non-governmental regulatory context. In particular, the focus on IA has enabled us to show the particular procedures through which IRAs seek to convince their forum members of the inherent knowledge-intensity of their policy making, which is critical to their public acceptance and authority (Maggetti 2010). Our analysis reveals the procedural limitations in the implementation of IA as a knowledge resource and the predominantly strategic rationales (Schrefler 2010(Schrefler , 2013 underpinning its use.…”

“…Firstly, these agencies represent non-elected (through some form of a democratic process) institutions and, as a result, are vulnerable to a potential democratic legitimacy deficit. More specifically, independent regulators do not have the same degree of external credibility as state institutions because, as Maggetti (2010) argues, a transfer of policy-making authority from the state to independent regulators does not automatically lead to a similar transfer of legitimacy and, in fact, leads to what he calls a ''net loss of legitimacy''. This legitimacy shortage engenders a heightened awareness of the need for regulating agencies to maintain a public perception of themselves as producers of fair and representative policy outputs.…”

Las agencias públicas en España: tensiones entre autonomía y rendición de cuentas

“…También se puede analizar como la autonomía de las agencias públicas tiene un efecto en su rendimiento y la calidad de los servicios que provee, su capacidad de mantener una cierta continuidad en su dinámica organizativa, o incluso en su potencial para introducir innovación y adaptación en contextos cambiantes (Laergreid y Verhoest, 2010;Verhoest et al, 2010;Maggetti y Verhoest, 2014). Otra dimensión importante es sin duda el impacto de la autonomía burocrática en la rendición de cuentas, ya que la alteración de las relaciones jerárquicas tradicionales abre una serie de interrogantes sobre el control político de las agencias públicas (Maggetti, 2010;Busiouc, 2009;Vershuere et al, 2006).…”