The Nature of Testimony

Lackey, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00254.x

Cited by 33 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…What view of testimony, then, will allow us to acknowledge that very young children can be a source of knowledge but at the same time acknowledge that, epistemically, they may not be as developed as adults? We think the most compelling account of testimony, and all the more compelling because it accommodates the child, is that offered by Lackey (2006). Lackey distinguishes between hearer testimony and speaker testimony and she defines each in terms of acts of communication rather than statements. Speaker Testimony : S testifies(t) that p by making an act of communication a if and only if S reasonably intends to convey the information that p (in part) in virtue of a 's communicable content.…”

Section: The Nature Of Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child

Burroughs¹,

Tollefsen²

2016

Episteme

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In Epistemic Injustice Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. Fricker's examples of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to testimonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserve. To illustrate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against children we document examples of negative prejudicial treatment in forensic contexts where children frequently act as testifiers. These examples, along with research on the child's competence and reliability as a testifier, reveal widespread epistemic prejudice against children. Given that subjection to prejudice can have a detrimental impact on children we discuss ways to ameliorate this form of testimonial injustice. We argue that, both in formal and natural contexts, the child's testimony should be evaluated alongside the relationships that support (or fail to support) her development as a testifier. The adult can play a central role in creating successful testimonial interactions with children by acting as a “responsible hearer.”

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Section: The Nature Of Testimonymentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child

Burroughs¹,

Tollefsen²

2016

Episteme

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“…Similarly, a number of philosophers have suggested that by asserting the speaker gives the audience certain entitlements, such as the entitlement to 'pass the epistemic buck' 6 Proponents of the knowledge norm include Williamson (2000), De Rose (2002) and Hawthorne (2004). Lackey (2007) herself defends an alternative norm that she calls the 'reasonable to believe norm'. 7 Goldberg (2015: 7) calls this the 'conveyed self-representation implicit in assertion' and suggests that it explains why 'an appropriate reaction to an assertion is to query how the speakers knows or has proper evidence'.…”

Section: Lackey's Case For Group Assertionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Group assertion and group silencing

Townsend

2020

Language & Communication

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“…5 5 Sosa (1991, 219). For views of the nature of testimony with various additional restrictions, see Ross (1975), Coady (1992), Graham (1997), and Lackey (2006b). …”

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Knowing from Testimony

Lackey

2006

Philosophy Compass

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Testimony is a vital and ubiquitous source of knowledge. Were we to refrain from accepting the testimony of others, our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways. Despite the vital role that testimony occupies in our epistemic lives, traditional epistemological theories have focused primarily on other sources, such as sense perception, memory, and reason, with relatively little attention devoted specifically to testimony. In recent years, however, the epistemic significance of testimony has been more fully appreciated. I shall here focus on two questions that have received the most attention in recent work in the epistemology of testimony. First, is testimonial knowledge acquired only by being transmitted from speaker to hearer? Second, must a hearer have positive reasons to justifiedly accept a speaker's testimony?

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The Nature of Testimony

Cited by 33 publications

References 9 publications

Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child

Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child

Group assertion and group silencing

Knowing from Testimony

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