The Neurobiological Underpinnings of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy

This article applies the free energy principle to the hard problem of consciousness. After clarifying some philosophical issues concerning functionalism, it identifies the elemental form of consciousness as affect and locates its physiological mechanism (an extended form of homeostasis) in the upper brainstem. This mechanism is then formalized in terms of free energy minimization (in unpredicted contexts) where decreases and increases in expected uncertainty are felt as pleasure and unpleasure, respectively. Emphasis is placed on the reasons why such existential imperatives feel like something to and for an organism.

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“…This section will be disproportionately short (see Solms, 2018a,d, in press, for fuller treatments).…”

Section: “Consciousness Arises Instead Of a Memory-trace”mentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 46 Cf. (Freud's, 1915a) “special characteristics of the system Ucs,” all of which can be reduced to the functional characteristics of the procedural and emotional memory systems (see Solms, 2018d). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle

2019

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“…However, the lack of direct quotes is also an issue with other theoretical models Linehan, 1993;Williams, 2014), but these theories have later been tested in quantitative studies. Importantly, during the last years, research from developmental psychology and neurobiology has been more integrated into psychodynamic intrapersonal and interpersonal perspectives (Bateman & Fonagy, 2019;Solms, 2018). Case studies have been supplied with other research methods (see Bateman & Fonagy, 2019;Gabbard, 2005;Fonagy et al, 2002).…”

Section: Inspired By Martymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The capacity for mentalization is operationalized in the Reflective Functioning Scale (RF; , and several empirical studies have studied RF in relation to attachment and psychopathology (Katznelson, 2002). Still, there is debated whether and how subjectivity and theories to understand the mind is testable -both in the psychodynamic literature (Solms, 2018;Panksepp & Solms, 2012;Sandler, Sandler, & Davies, 2000) and from different methodological perspectives (Willig, 2013). I return to this topic during the section on research design and chosen methodology.…”

Section: Inspired By Martymentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do Young People Understand Their Own Self-Harm? A Meta-synthesis of Adolescents’ Subjective Experience of Self-Harm

2018

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“…The same also holds for other mental features like self where neuronal accounts of cognitive (Churchland, 2002), dynamic pattern (Gallagher, 2005), affective (Panksepp, 1998a,b), attentional (Sui and Humphreys, 2015), embodied (Gallagher, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Hu et al, 2016), and temporo-spatial (Northoff, 2016a,b,c, d, 2017) theories of self have been suggested. Finally, affect has also been the focus where, rather than reducing it, neuronal and mental features are conceived as two sides of one and the same activity (which, metaphysically, presupposes dual-aspect monism)—this has recently been suggested by Mark Solms who conceives affect as most basic and primary manifestation of consciousness and mental features (Solms, 2017, 2018, 2019; see also Damasio, 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lessons From Astronomy and Biology for the Mind—Copernican Revolution in Neuroscience

Northoff

2019

Front. Hum. Neurosci.

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Neuroscience made major progress in unravelling the neural basis of mental features like self, consciousness, affect, etc. However, we nevertheless lack what recently has been described as “missing ingredient” or “common currency” in the relationship between neuronal and mental activity. Rather than putting forward yet another theory of the neural basis of mental features, I here suggest a change in our methodological strategy how to approach the brain, that is, our view or vantage point of the brain. Learning from astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin), I suggest that we may want to change our currently pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. Such post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain itself, e.g., the world, and how that shapes the brain and its neural activity, e.g., world-brain relation. We then lend empirical support to the world-brain relation by converging it with Karl Friston’s free energy principle that, as we see it, provides a neuro-ecological and therefore post-Copernican view of the brain. That, in turn, allows us taking into view that mental features are shaped by both world and brain and are therefore truly neuro-ecological rather than merely neuronal. This raises the question for the link, e.g., the “missing ingredient” or “common currency” of world brain relation and mental features. Recent empirical evidence suggests that temporo-spatial dynamics may provide such link as it characterizes both the world-brain relation’s free energy and mental features, e.g., their spatiotemporality as described in philosophy. Taken together, I here advocate a change in our methodological strategy on how to approach the brain, that is, a shift from a pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. The latter allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain in the world and how that shapes the brain in such a way that it can yield mental features. This amounts to nothing less than a Copernican turn or revolution in neuroscience akin to the ones in astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin).

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The Neurobiological Underpinnings of Psychoanalytic Theory and Therapy

Cited by 122 publications

References 62 publications

The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle

The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle

How Do Young People Understand Their Own Self-Harm? A Meta-synthesis of Adolescents’ Subjective Experience of Self-Harm

Lessons From Astronomy and Biology for the Mind—Copernican Revolution in Neuroscience

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