The New Federalism of Mexico's Party System

Abstract

Federalism is widely lauded for its ability to manage deep social divisions and promote efficient policy in democratic systems, but it has been criticized for its impact on party system nationalization. In this paper, we explore the role of formal and informal institutions on party system nationalization in the Mexican political system, focusing on legislative politics. In Mexico, an end of one-party rule transformed the nature of center-periphery relations, empowering subnational actors and giving them incentives to act on the national stage. Using an original dataset, we show that these changes resulted in national parties dividing along state lines on policy decisions, and that the magnitude of these divisions depends primarily on 1) the informal centralization of career resources, 2) the extent to which parties are ideological and programmatic, and 3) the personal vote incentives of electoral rules.

(Sub)national Principals, Legislative Agents

“…Much of this literature seeks evidence of state effects on roll call voting, suggesting that subnational actors, principally governors, are able to exert control over their legislative "agents" through their influence over the future careers of legislators. Furthermore, subnational influence may influence party discipline (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Carey, 2007) and committee organization . Furthermore, subnational influence may influence party discipline (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Carey, 2007) and committee organization .…”

“…Previous explanations that highlight gubernatorial influence in the candidate selection process are overstated (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Langston, 2010;Rosas & Langston, 2011), suggesting at a minimum that multiple principals influence the candidate selection process. Previous explanations that highlight gubernatorial influence in the candidate selection process are overstated (Cantú & Desposato, 2012;Langston, 2010;Rosas & Langston, 2011), suggesting at a minimum that multiple principals influence the candidate selection process.…”

Loyalty and Disloyalty in the Mexican Party System

“…Since Mexico is a federal system, it is also important to account for variation in state-level party systems in any explanation of party switching (Klesner 2005). Since the 1990s, political power has decentralized in Mexico, with governors in particular playing a powerful role in competition over federal resources and the political opportunities available in a given state (Cantú and Desposato 2012;Langston 2010;Rosas and Langston 2011). Most federal deputies pursue their political careers at the state level, and decisions to switch parties are probably influenced by the career opportunities afforded to them at that level, based on their party identification.…”

“…Literature on the Mexican party system tends to ignore the incidence of party switching. Most examples in the scholarly literature focus on defections from the former ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), during party system realignment in the 1980s and 1990s (Cantú and Desposato 2012;Klesner 2005;Wallis 2003). A case study of the Morelos state legislature also suggests proportional representation and Mexico's mixed electoral system may encourage party switching (Barrow 2007).…”

The Costs and Benefits of Party Switching in Mexico

“…The importance of party system institutionalization potentially explains why studies of the costs of party switching in Eastern Europe find that party switchers are able to switch to secure re-election and escape electoral accountability (e.g., Zielinski et al 2005). Studies of voting behavior in Mexico suggest that party identification and ideology are the strongest predictors of vote choice (Moreno 2009), and most analysts agree that Mexico has a stable, institutionalized party system (Cantú and Desposato 2012;Klesner 2005), which suggests that party switchers in Mexico will face electoral costs.…”