The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach

Tolley, Clinton

doi:10.1017/s1369415412000313

Cited by 90 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Watkins (2005) argues that epistemic readings of the "Second Analogy" will inevitably result in circularity, a contention borne out by Van Cleve's (1999, pp. Allais, 2009;Tolley, 2013). account does not deny that the content of intuitions includes features which cannot be represented by concepts (cf.…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Hutton

2018

European J of Philosophy

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In the “Second Analogy,” Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational purport. One exegetical question that remains controversial is this: how, and in what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of representations necessary? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: with certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual representations in a certain order. This interpretation fits Kant's text, his argumentative aims, and his broader views about causal inference, better than rival interpretations can. This result has important consequences for the ongoing debate over the role of normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind.

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Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…128-132) attempt to repair Beck's epistemic reading. McLear, 2014;Tolley, 2013). Allais, 2009;Tolley, 2013).…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Hutton

2018

European J of Philosophy

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“…6 See (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005 for statements of nonconceptualism and (Ginsborg 2008, Griffith 2012) for conceptualist replies. 7 See (Grüne 2009, McLear 2014, 2015, Tolley 2013. In this way, the debate about whether Kant is a conceptualist or a nonconceptualist has become detached from the discussion of conceptualism and nonconceptualism in the philosophy of perception literature, unlike, for example, the original discussion in (Hanna 2005).…”

Section: Spatial and Temporal Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy

Gomes¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter provides a background to the essays in Kant and the Philosophy of Mind. In the first part of the chapter, some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings are summarised. The second part charts some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind, with particular focus on the way in which Kant’s writings were taken up in the work of Wilfrid Sellars and P.F. Strawson. Finally, some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind are identified.

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“…Clinton Tolley notes that the recent debate has been unclear on Kant's term ‘content’ (Tolley, , pp. 108–109).…”

Section: Kant's Terminologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…108–109). Kant uses ‘content’ synonymously with ‘matter’ (A59/B83), and as the complement of ‘form.’ Tolley observes that the content of a representation is its relation to an object, for Kant (Tolley, , p. 112). The content is the representation's subject matter.…”

Section: Kant's Terminologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant's Conceptualism: a New Reading of the Transcendental Deduction

Shaddock

2017

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I defend a novel interpretation of Kant's conceptualism regarding the contents of our perceptual experiences. Conceptualist interpreters agree that Kant's Deduction aims to prove that intuitions require the categories for their spatiality and temporality. But conceptualists disagree as to which features of space and time make intuitions require the categories. Interpreters have cited the singularity, unity, infinity, and homogeneity of space and time. But this is incompatible with Kant's Aesthetic, which aims to prove that these same features qualify space and time as intuitions, not concepts. On my interpretation, the feature is objectivity. Space and time are objective, in that they ground our judgments in geometry and mechanics.

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The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach

Cited by 90 publications

References 33 publications

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Epistemic normativity in Kant's “Second Analogy”

Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy

Kant's Conceptualism: a New Reading of the Transcendental Deduction

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