The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience

Abstract

I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.There are two radically different conceptions of perceptual experience. According to relationalism, perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of standing in an awareness or an acquaintance relation to objects. According to representationalism, perceptual experience is fundamentally a matter of representing objects. Relationalism and representationalism are widely considered to be in conflict. 1 I aim to show that they are not in conflict with one another and, indeed, that perceptual experience is best thought of as fundamentally both relational and representational.

Introduction: Perception Without Representation

“…Furthermore, some externalist forms of representationalism on which an experience cannot have the same particular content in the absence of the object represented (e.g. Burge 1991;Dretske 1995;Lycan 2001;Schellenberg 2010) might be seen as compatible with this form of relationalism and the above interpretation of the constitution claim. This highlights the similarity between variants of each view, illustrating how difficult it is to precisely delineate the disagreement between relationalist and representationalist positions.…”

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Second Edition)

“…Phenomenal concepts, the content of phenomenal and intentional states, and our knowledge of that content have been investigated (Chalmers 2004b(Chalmers , 2005(Chalmers , 2003Macdonald 1995). The lessons to be learned about consciousness from Consequentialism cognitive science is a focus of australasian research (hohwy andFrith 2004a, 2004b;hohwy 2007;opie 1999, 2000;Shea and bayne 2010), as is the nature and phenomenology of perception (bayne 2009;Fish 2008Fish , 2009Schellenberg 2010Schellenberg , 2011. Finally, the Centre for Consciousness at the australian national university continues to be a hub of research and discussion of the many intriguing philosophical questions about consciousness.…”

Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science since 1980

“…Thirdly, among the topics significantly advanced by Jackson's Perception: a representative theory (1977), Australasian philosophers took a particular interest in colour perception, a topic which integrated developments in metaphysics and philosophy of mind (Bigelow, Collins, and Pargetter 1990;Maund 1995Maund , 2006Gold 1999;Menzies 2009). Fourth, questions about the nature of perceptual content have been freshly treated in Schellenberg's account of the essential situation-dependence of perceptual experience, which on her view is both representational and relational (Schellenberg 2008(Schellenberg , 2010. Finally, standard issues about direct or naïve realism have continued to be debated since Jackson's staunch defence of the representative theory of perception.…”