The Past's Promise: Lessons from Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East

Abstract

Just as the Northern Ireland and Israeli–Palestinian peace processes appeared close to achieving lasting resolutions to conflict, both initiatives fell into crisis. This study combines power conflict and transaction cost approaches to analyze the strengths and the weaknesses of the Belfast Good Friday (BGF) and the Oslo peace processes. Dimensions that empower participants and increase certainty strengthen peace processes. Dimensions that are disempowering of participants and decrease certainty weaken peace processes. The two peace processes shared the strengths of including militant nationalists in negotiations and generating international pressure and support. Unlike the Oslo process, the BGF process benefited from greater constitutional certainty, minority safeguards, grass-roots legitimacy, effective responses to spoilers, and minority-supportive intervention by the US government. Unlike the BGF process, the Oslo process benefited from broad international participation in negotiations, leading to agreements that had clearly specified mechanisms for implementation. Shared weaknesses of the two processes included transgressing zero-sum game assumptions and identity boundaries, manipulation of popular fears by elites, and the marginal, if not negative, role played by civil society. In addition to pointing out ways that each peace process could benefit by appropriating the advantages of the other, the article offers several promising strategies for overcoming shared weaknesses, including challenging zero-sum assumptions, constructing more inclusive collective identities, grass-roots education regarding manipulative elites, strengthening non-sectarian segments of civil society, and breaking cycles of violence through reconciliation processes.

The outbreak of peace in Israeli children's periodicals, 1977–1979

“…6 Compared to the rich research on war in the Middle East, the subject of peace and its ramifications has gained a relatively narrow niche but one gradually broadening in the last three decades (Reznik 2002). Much of the research in this field focuses on the political and psychological aspects of the peace process (Inbar 2000;Barak 2005;Maney et al 2006) in addition to the short-and long-term socio-political outcomes of peacemaking (Arian 1995) and peace journalism (Shinar 2000;Mandelzis 2003;Shinar 2004). The issue of reconciliation has also motivated the opening of new avenues of research (Maoz 2000;Shamir and Shikaki 2002;Bar-Siman-Tov 2004) during the last decade.…”

Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

“…During this time of violence, it became especially challenging to continue grassroots‐level activities. Indeed, some observers have charged that the Oslo process was too focused on secrecy and on back channel talks to address peacebuilding barriers at the elite level and not focused enough on mobilizing the grassroots in support of the peace process (Maney et al. 2006; Lieberfeld 2008; Wanis‐St.…”

Explaining Political Violence Against Civilians in Northern Ireland: A Contention-Oriented Approach

“…For example, civilians can be targeted simply for fraternizing with opposing combatants or complicit civilians. The act of "crossing over" is viewed as a betrayala violation of group commitment worthy of violent expiation (Maney 2005 ;Maney, Ibrahim, Higgins, and Herzog 2006). At other times, simply refusing to provide support requested by combatants can be grounds for being altacked.…”

“…The colon• izing logic of political contention also helps us to understand the tendency to view most, if not all, members of a collectivity as being complicit in contention. Moreover, creating strong discursi ve, relational, and physical boundaries with an opposing group facilitates the development of a strong movement identity and, in tum, high levels of active participation in the struggle (Taylor and Whittier 1992;Maney et a!. 2006;White 20 10).…”