“…Table 1 provides an overview of the literature on BAB along the two dimensions outlined above. (Pierson, 1994(Pierson, , 1996 BAB as a means of pursuing risky reforms (Vis, 2016) Arms-length institutional bodies that displace blame (Fiorina, 1982;Horn, 1995) Indexing provisions that limit budgetary discretion (Weaver, 1988) Opposition of policies that impose large and direct costs (Arnold, 1990) Blame-decreasing organizational responses to demands for transparency (Hood and Rothstein, 2001) Responsibility-blurring governance vacuums in multi-level systems (Bache et al, 2015) Reactive BAB Justification for retrenchment and its effects (Mortensen, 2012;Wenzelburger and Hörisch, 2016) Blame-deflecting effects of political accounts (McGraw, 1991) Cabinet officials as 'lightning rods' (Ellis, 1994) Blame management after crisis situations (Bovens et al, 1999;Brändström and Kuipers, 2003;Brändström et al, 2008;Hood et al, 2009;Boin et al, 2010;Moynihan, 2012;Brändström, 2015) Commissions of inquiry for blame avoidance reasons (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010) Blame attribution effects of public sector reforms (Mortensen, 2013b) Conceptualizing BAB…”