Governing After Crisis 2008
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511756122.005
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The politics of tsunami responses: comparing patterns of blame management in Scandinavia

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Cited by 46 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…Table 1 provides an overview of the literature on BAB along the two dimensions outlined above. (Pierson, 1994(Pierson, , 1996 BAB as a means of pursuing risky reforms (Vis, 2016) Arms-length institutional bodies that displace blame (Fiorina, 1982;Horn, 1995) Indexing provisions that limit budgetary discretion (Weaver, 1988) Opposition of policies that impose large and direct costs (Arnold, 1990) Blame-decreasing organizational responses to demands for transparency (Hood and Rothstein, 2001) Responsibility-blurring governance vacuums in multi-level systems (Bache et al, 2015) Reactive BAB Justification for retrenchment and its effects (Mortensen, 2012;Wenzelburger and Hörisch, 2016) Blame-deflecting effects of political accounts (McGraw, 1991) Cabinet officials as 'lightning rods' (Ellis, 1994) Blame management after crisis situations (Bovens et al, 1999;Brändström and Kuipers, 2003;Brändström et al, 2008;Hood et al, 2009;Boin et al, 2010;Moynihan, 2012;Brändström, 2015) Commissions of inquiry for blame avoidance reasons (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010) Blame attribution effects of public sector reforms (Mortensen, 2013b) Conceptualizing BAB…”
Section: Four Worlds Of Blame Avoidancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Table 1 provides an overview of the literature on BAB along the two dimensions outlined above. (Pierson, 1994(Pierson, , 1996 BAB as a means of pursuing risky reforms (Vis, 2016) Arms-length institutional bodies that displace blame (Fiorina, 1982;Horn, 1995) Indexing provisions that limit budgetary discretion (Weaver, 1988) Opposition of policies that impose large and direct costs (Arnold, 1990) Blame-decreasing organizational responses to demands for transparency (Hood and Rothstein, 2001) Responsibility-blurring governance vacuums in multi-level systems (Bache et al, 2015) Reactive BAB Justification for retrenchment and its effects (Mortensen, 2012;Wenzelburger and Hörisch, 2016) Blame-deflecting effects of political accounts (McGraw, 1991) Cabinet officials as 'lightning rods' (Ellis, 1994) Blame management after crisis situations (Bovens et al, 1999;Brändström and Kuipers, 2003;Brändström et al, 2008;Hood et al, 2009;Boin et al, 2010;Moynihan, 2012;Brändström, 2015) Commissions of inquiry for blame avoidance reasons (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2010) Blame attribution effects of public sector reforms (Mortensen, 2013b) Conceptualizing BAB…”
Section: Four Worlds Of Blame Avoidancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this respec documentary records modify reality by constructing the severity of, and the agency and responsibility for, event (cf. Brandström et al, 2008;Raška et al, 2014). Moreover, the availability of documentary data vari highly through time (Guzzetti et al, 1994), and therefore affects the reliability of any time-series of social impacts.…”
Section:    mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Secondly, the combination of different sources (Raška et al, 2014) and agenda setting in sources with editorial boards and/or documents underpinned by political, economic or social goals, result in significant variations in the language style and structure (e.g. McCombs and Shaw, 1972;Brandström et al, 2008). Finding a standardized sequence of reports on social impacts and disaster relief is possible only in some cases (see for example, Raška and Brázdil, 2015, for a series of reports on historical disaster relief funding).…”
Section: Reliability Of the Datasetmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Om kritikken var omfattende, og utenrikstjenesten åpenbart opplevde et legitimitetstap, var allikevel reaksjonen i Norge (og også i Finland) mindre omfattende enn i Sverige (Brändström et al 2008), hvor lignende problemer ble lest inn i en større fortelling om svenskhet. Der ble den manglende krisehåndteringen ikke bare et spørsmål om manglende beredskap, den ble også lest som symptom på en brist i den svenske nasjonalkarakteren, og som et brudd med den svenske sosiale kontrakten (Buus 2011: 295-296, Brändström et al (2008 har et noe mindre dramatisk perspektiv).…”
Section: Nordmenn I Utlandetunclassified