The Rationality of Perception

Siegel, Susanna

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198797081.001.0001

Cited by 175 publications

(126 citation statements)

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Section: Passivity Proximity and Puritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Susanna Siegel in her (), broadens the discussion beyond cognitive penetration, to perceptual processing more generally. She argues that “both perceptual experiences and the processes by which they arise can be rational or irrational” (:15). Siegel claims that certain quasi‐inferential moves that would in the case of belief be irrational, are similarly capable of downgrading the epistemic power of an experience (and that some such transitions are capable in turn of upgrading their epistemic power).…”

Section: Passivity Proximity and Puritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The evidence is counted once in the generation of the visual experience, and then again at the point when beliefs are based upon the visual experience. Siegel () discusses similar examples, focusing on the way in which Bayesian models of perception allow background hypotheses about the likely shape or colour of an object to play a role in determining the percept one ultimately has of that stimulus. Siegel clams that any strengthening of confidence in the hypotheses which played a role in the determination of the experience on its basis is illicit (:117).…”

Section: Hypotheses and Minimalist Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms

Munton

2017

Philosophical Perspectives

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Section: Passivity Proximity and Puritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Passivity Proximity and Puritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hypotheses and Minimalist Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms

Munton

2017

Philosophical Perspectives

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“…The third section reviews several ways of combining PP with an internalist foundationalist account of perception, beginning with a strong view according to which perceptual experience provides immediate prima facie justification for belief despite what happens at the subpersonal level (Fumerton 2013;Huemer 2013), and ending with a weak Siegelian view (Siegel 2012(Siegel , 2013(Siegel , 2017b according to which even subpersonal priors are relevant for perceptual justification. Although the strong view clearly remains foundationalist, PP appears to undercut its motivation for considering perceptual experience as the unjustified justifier of perceptual belief.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception

Ghijsen

2018

Synthese

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Predictive processing accounts of perception (PP) assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be reconciled with PP from both an internalist and externalist perspective, and argue that an externalist foundationalism provides the best match with PP.

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“…See, e.g., Siegel, manuscript – though Siegel's use of ‘inference’ is quite broad and thus may accommodate the relevant intuition.…”

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confidence: 99%

Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory

Quilty‐Dunn

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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According to a classic but nowadays discarded philosophical theory, perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and full‐blown propositional beliefs. This classical dual‐component theory of experience is often taken to be obsolete. In particular, there seem to be cases in which perceptual experience and belief conflict: cases of known illusions, wherein subjects have beliefs contrary to the contents of their experiences. Modern dual‐component theories reject the belief requirement and instead hold that perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and some other sort of conceptual state. The most popular modern dual‐component theory appeals to sui generis propositional attitudes called ‘perceptual seemings’. This article argues that the classical dual‐component theory has the resources to explain known illusions without giving up the claim that the conceptual components of experience are beliefs. The classical dual‐component view, though often viewed as outdated and implausible, should be regarded as a serious contender in contemporary debates about the nature of perceptual experience.

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The Rationality of Perception

Cited by 175 publications

References 0 publications

The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms

The Eye's Mind: Perceptual Process and Epistemic Norms

Predictive processing and foundationalism about perception

Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory

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