The Right to Data Protection

Using Open, Public Data for Security Provision: Ethical Perspectives on Risk-Based Border Checks in the EU

“…First, however, one must note that claims to informational privacy are often understood almost synonymous to claims to data protection. As Poscher ( 2017 , p. 131) notes, however, “Europe is still not at ease with the right to data protection … Fundamental rights usually protect a general or specific liberty or equality interest. But what, specifically, should that be in the case of the right to data protection?” In answer to a wave of criticism leveled in this vein against the right, he proposes that data protection should not be considered a right on its own at all, but rather as a “systematic enhancement of other fundamental rights” (Poscher 2017 , p. 136).…”

“…As Poscher ( 2017 , p. 131) notes, however, “Europe is still not at ease with the right to data protection … Fundamental rights usually protect a general or specific liberty or equality interest. But what, specifically, should that be in the case of the right to data protection?” In answer to a wave of criticism leveled in this vein against the right, he proposes that data protection should not be considered a right on its own at all, but rather as a “systematic enhancement of other fundamental rights” (Poscher 2017 , p. 136). Data protection, he argues, is essentially about abstract dangers : “The collection of data as such does no harm … It is only the use of data in certain contexts that might cause a violation of liberty or equality interests.…”

“…Data protection, he argues, is essentially about abstract dangers : “The collection of data as such does no harm … It is only the use of data in certain contexts that might cause a violation of liberty or equality interests. The collection of personal data about political or religious convictions … is generally prohibited, for example, because of the potential that it could be misused by the state to discriminate against certain political or religious groups … It does not require concrete evidence that misuse of the data has taken place, or even that such a misuse is about to occur” (Poscher 2017 , p. 137). Consequently, he argues that, when dealing with issues of data protection, we cannot limit ourselves to privacy rights or the specifics of data protection regulation, but rather spell out to what extent a certain form of data collection and processing is posing an abstract danger for the exercise of what kind of fundamental right (Poscher 2017 , p. 137).…”

“…The collection of personal data about political or religious convictions … is generally prohibited, for example, because of the potential that it could be misused by the state to discriminate against certain political or religious groups … It does not require concrete evidence that misuse of the data has taken place, or even that such a misuse is about to occur” (Poscher 2017 , p. 137). Consequently, he argues that, when dealing with issues of data protection, we cannot limit ourselves to privacy rights or the specifics of data protection regulation, but rather spell out to what extent a certain form of data collection and processing is posing an abstract danger for the exercise of what kind of fundamental right (Poscher 2017 , p. 137). I will follow Poscher in this clarification as part of my broader ethical analysis; hence, I will assume that OSINT may collide with further fundamental value concepts besides privacy.…”

“…“The collection of data as such does no harm … It is only the use of data in certain contexts that might cause a violation of liberty or equality interests. The collection of personal data about political or religious convictions … is generally prohibited, for example, because of the potential that it could be misused by the state to discriminate against certain political or religious groups … It does not require concrete evidence that misuse of the data has taken place, or even that such a misuse is about to occur” (Poscher 2017 , p. 137).…”