The Role Model of the Board: a preliminary study of the roles of Icelandic boards

Jonsson, Eythor Ivar

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00462.x

Cited by 28 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…According to Zahra and Pearce (1989: 298) "… boards are expected to perform qualitatively different roles at various points in the [firm's] life cycle". Board role adaptation is thus relative to changing firm circumstances (Jonsson, 2005;Lynall et al, 2003), which are reflected in the growing demands on the board (Huse, 2007) and the nature of modern businesses.…”

Section: Board Roles In Smes: a Portfolio Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

SME growth trajectories, transitions and board role portfolios: A critical review and integrative model

Ingley

Khlif²,

Karoui³

2016

International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurs

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This article presents a novel framework integrating a dynamic states approach to firm growth and a portfolio perspective of board roles. In our framework we highlight four typical firm growth states aligned with primary board roles to guide firms effectively through the transitions associated with each state to reach a new equilibrium. The particular contribution of our framework is that it takes SME heterogeneity into account, while capturing the dynamic nature of these states which are reached along non-linear, non-sequential and non-deterministic transitional pathways, as well as incorporating reverse and counterintuitive trajectories between states. KeywordsTransitions, SMEs, board role portfolio, dynamic states 2 IntroductionA large and growing literature relates to the governance of small and medium firms (SMEs), with extensive debate over the value and contribution of boards of directors and their roles in this context (Boxer et al., 2016;Gnan et al., 2015; Wilson et al., 2014). Much of this debate considers board value from a static perspective. However, the question of board value and contribution is more complex when considered in circumstances of dynamic change. Recent studies have attempted to address this question by researching board roles in conjunction with small firm growth paths and the changes experienced over the course of their existence (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009;Filatotchev et al., 2006;Perrault and McHugh, 2015).Two key issues arise from this debate. The first issue relates to an almost exclusive use of life cycle models to match board roles with SME growth patterns (Bonn and Pettigrew, 2009;Lynall et al., 2003) and transitions accompanying growth (Filatotchev et al., 2006;Perrault and McHugh, 2015). The focus on growth and life cycles implies unidirectional, deterministic patterns of development and ignores the complex realities that most firms encounter, such as erratic growth, turnaround situations and reversals due to decline or other negative impacts (Perrault and McHugh, 2015). The second issue concerns the highly heterogeneous and dynamic nature of SMEs (Delmar et al., 2003;Empson, 2010;Phelps et al., 2007), making it difficult to encapsulate theoretically their governance needs in a comprehensive model. 3These issues indicate the need for a broader conceptualisation that reflects more adequately the complexities associated with small firm heterogeneity and dynamics, in addressing the question of how SME boards can add strategic value. The novel framework we develop in this paper provides a more complete specification of both board and firm characteristics associated with transitional dynamics through growth and transformation.While recognizing the overlap of board roles, as well as the need for boards to perform more than a single role, our model highlights the most valuable board role for each transition we depict. To ground our framework, we review and build on two streams of literature relating to board roles in smaller firms, and SME growth and development models.Nume...

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Section: Board Roles In Smes: a Portfolio Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

SME growth trajectories, transitions and board role portfolios: A critical review and integrative model

Ingley

Khlif²,

Karoui³

2016

International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurs

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“…The board's ability to monitor management attracted attention following the collapse of Maxwell Publishing Group, BCCI and Poly Peck in the United Kingdom (Rashid, 2013). The Cadbury Code developed and published in response to these collapses (Jonsson, 2005), made recommendations for board reforms, including the structural independence of the board (Rashid, 2013).…”

Section: Overview Of Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

CEO Compensation in the U.S.: Are CEOs Underpaid or Overpaid ?

James¹,

Kim²

2018

AFR

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This study investigates the adequacy of CEO compensation from the perspective of using accounting measures to assess the performance of CEOs. The main objective of this research is to determine to what extent compensation packages received by American CEOs represent an underpayment of CEOs based on the performance of their firms when firm performance is defined in terms of accounting measures. CEO compensation data are obtained from Compustat, 10K SEC filings, and Forbes listing of CEO data. The analysis covers a two-phased time period i.e., before and after the financial crisis in the USA. CEO compensation data are analyzed for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 (pre-financial crisis) and for years 2009 to 2013 (post financial crisis). Multiple regression models consisting of six accounting performance measures are used to perform the analysis to determine the extent of CEO underpayment or overpayment. Having examined 1151 CEO compensation packages to determine if CEO underpayment exist in light of what is an overwhelming literature supporting CEO overpayment, the results show that 67.33% of the CEOs were in fact underpaid based on their firms performance, and only 32.67% (376 CEOs) were overpaid based on firm performance.

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“…Gedurende het laatste decennium is de maatschappelijke aandacht voor corporate governance sterk toegenomen. Bedrijfsschandalen zoals Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat en Ahold hebben het corporate governance debat verder aangezwengeld (Ingley en Van der Walt, 2005;Jonsson, 2005;Kiel en Nicholson, 2003) en tot wereldwijde corporate governance hervormingen geleid (Enrione et al, 2006). Enkele voorbeelden hiervan zijn de 'Sarbanes-Oxley Act' in de Verenigde Staten, nieuwe Europese richtlijnen en nieuwe nationale wetgeving.…”

Section: Inleidingunclassified