The SDT model of belief bias: Complexity, time, and cognitive ability mediate the effects of believability.

Abstract

When people evaluate conclusions, they are often influenced by prior beliefs. Prevalent theories claim that belief bias affects the quality of syllogistic reasoning. However, recent work by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) has suggested that belief bias may be a simple response bias. In Experiment 1, receiver operating characteristic analysis revealed that believability affected accuracy for complex but not for simple syllogisms. In Experiment 2, the effect of believability on accuracy disappeared when judgments were made under time pressure and with participants low in cognitive capacity. The observed effects on reasoning accuracy indicate that beliefs influence more than response bias when conditions are conducive to the use of certain reasoning strategies. The findings also underscore the need to consider individual differences in reasoning.

Better but still biased: Analytic cognitive style and belief bias

“…Their data was consistent with the idea that belief bias may just be a response bias. Trippas, Handley, and Verde (2013), using SDT, only partially replicated their finding. In contrast to the lower cognitive ability (CA) participants who operated according to the response bias account, higher CA participants showed more signs of motivated reasoning These findings were replicated and extended in an additional study using the forced-choice reasoning paradigm (Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014b).…”

“…Thus, the incongruent base-rate problem is considered an ACS measure because it cues an intuitive response based on the stereotypical information that requires an extra level of analytic reasoning to override, whereas the neutral base-rate problem is considered a CA measure because it assesses one's ability to use base-rate information in judgement (see De Neys & Glumicic, 2008;Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014b). Based on our previous work (Trippas et al, 2013), we predict systematic individual differences in the tendency to show motivated reasoning as a function of analytic factors. If the quality hypothesis holds, CA should be a better predictor of motivated reasoning than ACS.…”

“…Eight valid and eight invalid syllogisms were repeated four times with randomly assigned item contents for each participant (cf. Trippas et al, 2013). Belief was manipulated using true or false item contents (e.g., believable: Some animals are not cats, unbelievable: Some cats are not animals).…”

Beliefs and Bayesian reasoning

“…Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) have made an analogous claim regarding the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. Dube et al (2010) argued that the tendency to judge a syllogism with a believable conclusion as valid is due to an effect of believability on the response criterion, rather than an effect on the perception of the argument's strength (cf., Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 2013). We acknowledge that further research is clearly needed to explore this issue in the context of Bayesian reasoning.…”

Belief bias is stronger when reasoning is more difficult

“…In fact, a recent approach using the Signal Detection theory (e.g., Dube, Rotello, and Heit, 2010) has suggested that belief bias may be explicable solely in terms of response bias, with no reasoning component. However, evidence for the lack of a reasoning component is ambiguous (see Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 2013).…”