The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations

Claessens, Stijn; Djankov, Simeon; Lang, Larry H.P.

doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2

Cited by 4,242 publications

(2,448 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The matrix approach followed in this paper is challenged, for instance, by the socalled weakest link method (Claessens et al, 2000). However, the matrix design used, e.g., for consolidation remains in our view the most adequate for determining consistently integrated ownership and integrated control.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Controlling Firms Through the Majority Voting Rule

Chapelle

Szafarz

2005

SSRN Journal

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Pyramids, cross-ownership, rings and other complex features inducing control tunnelling are frequent in the European and Asian industrial world. Based on the matrix methodology, this paper offers a model for measuring integrated ownership and threshold-based control, applicable to any group of interrelated firms. In line with the theory on pyramidal control, the model avoids the double counting problem and sets the full-control threshold at the conservative -but incontestable -majority level of 50% of the voting shares. Any lower threshold leads to potential inconsistencies and leaves unexplained the observed high level of ownership of many dominant shareholders. Furthermore, the models lead to ultimate shareholders' control ratios consistent with the majority voting rule. Finally, it is applied to the Frère Group, a large European pyramidal holding company known for mastering control leverages.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The 20% level, probably inspired by the influential paper by La Porta et al (1999) is chosen, for instance, by Claessens et al (2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Controlling Firms Through the Majority Voting Rule

Chapelle

Szafarz

2005

SSRN Journal

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“…The current study seeks to contribute to literature by re-examining the issue focusing on the impact of different types of ownership on the accuracy of forecast. The Malaysian setting is characterized by not only ownership concentration per se [3], but according to [4] with low litigious environment of shareholders protection. These are significant features of Malaysian companies that distinguish the statues of agency problem from those of developed countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ownership Structure and Earnings Forecast Accuracy: Evidence from Malaysian IPOs

Ibrahim¹,

Ismail²

2015

JOEBM

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“…Plus récemment, Claessens et al (2000) se basent sur les arguments de La Porta et al (1999) pour justifier le choix des seuils de 20 % et de 10 %. Pour ces auteurs, le seuil varie en fonction de la législation du pays étudié.…”

Section: Concentration Et Dispersion De L'actionnariatunclassified

“…Dans tous ces pays, les droits de vote excèdent les droits aux dividendes, via l'utilisation de pyramides et de participations croisées, surtout en Indonésie, en Thaïlande et à Singapour. Pour Claessens et al (2000), une structure de contrôle est pyramidale lorsque une société détient au moins 20 % des actions dans une autre qui à son tour détient au moins 20 % des actions dans une autre, etc. C'est ainsi que plus de 65 % des sociétés indonésiennes sont contrôlées via des pyramides, pour 55 % à Singapour et 49 % à Taiwan.…”

Section: La Méthode De La Porta Lopes-de-silanes Et Schleifer (1999)unclassified

Les leviers de contrôle des actionnaires majoritaires

Biebuyck¹,

Chapelle²,

Szafarz³

2017

gouvernance

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La littérature académique en gouvernance d’entreprise étudie en particulier la séparation entre propriété et contrôle au sein de l’actionnariat des entreprises privées. Cet article propose une synthèse critique et des illustrations internationales des résultats les plus récents en la matière. En particulier, il détaille les mécanismes permettant aux actionnaires dominants d’accroître leur contrôle d’une société, parmi lesquels : les structures pyramidales, les participations croisées et les actions à droits de vote multiples, qui offrent la possibilité de découpler le contrôle de la part effectivement détenue dans le capital de l’entreprise. Ces phénomènes, plus ou moins présents dans les différentes régions du monde, jouent un rôle fondamental puisqu’ils contribuent à l’accroissement des asymétries entre actionnaires d’une même entreprise et engendrent des opportunités de bénéfices privés en faveur de certains d’entre eux. Leur impact s’étend bien au-delà de la sphère de l’entreprise concernée et peut affecter le fonctionnement même des marchés financiers. La quantification du niveau de contrôle au sein d’un empire industriel peut être obtenue à l’aide de diverses méthodes. Les développements récents en la matière sont résumés et l’application à des cas internationaux réels est discutée.The academic literature on corporate governance has taken a particular interest in the separation of property and control within bodies of corporate shareholders. This article provides a critical synthesis and international examples of the most recent results in this area. More particularly, it outlines the mechanisms through which controlling shareholders increase their control over a corporation (including pyramid structures), cross-shareholding, and shares with multiple voting rights. All of these mechanisms potentially provide the means of divorcing control from the proportion of corporate capital stock effectively held. These phenomena, present to a lesser or greater degree across the planet, play a fundamental role as they increasingly skew the relationship among shareholders of the same corporation while also creating opportunities for private benefits for some. Their impact extends well beyond the sphere of the corporation itself and may even affect the operation of financial markets. There are several ways of quantifying the level of control within an industrial empire. Recent developments in this field are summarized, and their application to true international cases is discussed

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The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations

Cited by 4,242 publications

References 18 publications

Controlling Firms Through the Majority Voting Rule

Controlling Firms Through the Majority Voting Rule

Ownership Structure and Earnings Forecast Accuracy: Evidence from Malaysian IPOs

Les leviers de contrôle des actionnaires majoritaires

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